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A Note on Format: 
 
 The format of this thesis subscribes to the conventions of historical research rather 
than to the conventions of basic science research.  The thesis therefore follows the 
following format: 
 
Introduction:  Establishes the study’s purpose, context, and background. 
Main Body:  Presents historical findings, integrating data and analysis to clarify the 
issues presented and to begin to build a particular argument. 
Conclusion:  Synthesizes the analysis to offer a succinct interpretation of the events and a 
further explanation of the importance of the issues explored.
Abstract 
“NO OBSERVED ADVERSE EFFECTS:” DEVELOPING NEURONS, ORGANO-
PHOSPHATE INSECTICIDES AND THE 1996 FOOD QUALITY PROTECTION ACT.  
Brendan R. Jackson (Sponsored by John Harley Warner).  Department of the History of 
Medicine, Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, CT. 
 
 
 Physicians are familiar with organophosphates (OPs) as a classic, though obscure, cause 
of cholinergic poisoning.  Many opportunities for human exposure exist—sixty million pounds of 
OPs are applied as insecticides to sixty million acres of U.S. land each year, and, until recently, 
over one-fifth of Americans used these chemicals in their homes.  Most physicians, however, still 
know little about the dangers that these pesticides pose to the developing nervous system.  By the 
late 1980s, toxicologists increasingly recognized that toxicants such as lead and mercury, even at 
doses well-below the level required to cause symptomatic poisoning, could induce subtle, yet 
permanent, neurological deficits if the exposure occurred during critical periods of brain 
development.  In the early 1990s, scientists and regulators began to realize that developmental 
neurotoxicity (DNT), as this phenomenon was called, could also result from OPs.  In 1996 
Congress passed the Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA), marking a major turning point in the 
regulation of hazardous chemicals.  Prior to the FQPA, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) based its calculations of pesticide risk on adults and largely neglected the increased 
susceptibility of infants and children.  The new law took a precautionary stance, protecting the 
vulnerable neural and physical development of the fetus and child with the inclusion of a 10-X 
safety factor, and shifting the burden of proof from health advocates to the pesticide 
manufacturers.  The ensuing ten-year battle between health groups, pesticide manufacturers, and 
the EPA over the law’s enforcement now provides an instructive lesson into the complex 
scientific, political, and economic world of environmental health, and serves as a relatively 
successful example of effective policy improving public health.
Acknowledgements 
 Though history research is a more solitary endeavor than most forms of medical 
research, I owe a large debt of gratitude to a number of people who helped make this 
thesis possible.  First to my thesis advisor, Dr. John Harley Warner at the History of 
Medicine Department, who not only provided guidance and support, but also had the 
patience to teach me the basics of historical writing.  Thanks also to Dr. John Wargo at 
the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies whose book served as my primer 
to the complex world of pesticide regulation, and who patiently met with me as I 
struggled to make sense of NOAELs, 10-X factors, and the DNT controversy. A special 
thanks to my father, Dr. Richard Jackson, whose personal experiences with the FQPA led 
me to study a topic far from the normal purview of medicine, and whose comments I 
found particularly valuable while writing.  Thank you to Dr. Lynn Goldman, former EPA 
pesticides administrator, who explained some of the internal and external forces assailing 
the EPA during the FQPA’s implementation. Thanks to Ken Cook, president of the 
EWG; Richard Wiles, cofounder of the EWG; and Dr. Philip Landrigan, professor at the 
Mt. Sinai School of Medicine, whose responses to my question, “How in the world did 
this law get passed?” were very enlightening.  Thank you to all the authors whose works I 
have cited—or appropriated—particularly historians David Rosner, Gerald Markowitz, 
Christopher Sellers, Gregg Mitman, Linda Nash, Edmund Russell, and Robert Gottlieb.  
Finally, a huge thanks to my fiancée, Cheryl Maier, who unwearyingly edited, and made 
sense of, my many pages of convoluted text. 
Table of Contents 
Introduction         page 6 
Developmental Toxicology of Organophosphates    page 13 
Environment in Medicine       page 17 
Developmental Neurotoxicity       page 20 
The Case of Lead        page 24 
Evolution of Pesticides and Pesticide Legislation    page 29 
Organophosphate Pesticides       page 36 
The 1996 Food Quality Protection Act     page 43 
Total Organophosphate Elimination?      page 50 
Enforcement Begins        page 59 
Chlorpyrifos: Effects Observed 2000-2001     page 61 
Cumulative Assessment       page 66 
Discord at the EPA        page 71 
Conclusion         page 74 
References         page 80 
Abbreviations and Glossary 
 
ACPA  American Crop Protection Association (now CropLife America) 
AFBF  American Farm Bureau Federation 
CU  Consumer’s Union 
CDC   Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
CRA  Cumulative Risk Assessment 
DFP  Diisopropyl Fluorophosphate  
DNT  Developmental Neurotoxicity 
EPA  Environmental Protection Agency 
EWG  Environmental Working Group 
FDA  Food and Drug Administration 
FQPA  Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 
IPM  Integrated Pest Management 
LOAEL Lowest Observed (or Observable) Adverse Effects Level 
NAS  National Academy of Sciences 
NIEHS  National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences 
NOAEL No Observed (or Observable) Adverse Effects Level 
NRC  National Research Council (the research arm of the NAS) 
NRDC  Natural Resources Defense Council 
OP  Organophosphate 
OC  Organochlorine (including DDT, dieldrin, and chlordane) 
OPIDP  Organophosphate-Induced Delayed Polyneuropathy 
TOCP  Tri-Ortho-Cresyl Phosphate (a non-pesticide OP causing OPIDP) 
USDA  United States Department of Agriculture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“No Observed Adverse Effects:” Developing Neurons, Organophosphate Insecticides, 
and the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the 
Yale University School of Medicine 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Medicine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
Brendan R. Jackson 
 
2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1
1
“No Observed Adverse Effects:” Developing Neurons, Organophosphate Insecticides and 
the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act 
 
 
Introduction 
 
So much literature dealing with the adverse effects of pesticides on human and 
animal life has appeared in the years since the 1962 publication of Rachel 
Carson’s Silent Spring that the author of yet another work on the subject feels 
obligated to provide an apology. 
   -James Whorton, Before Silent Spring, 1974 [1] 
 Pesticide.  It has been a word full of undertones for over a hundred years.  To the 
mid-twentieth-century American public, it connoted sanitation and hygiene, freedom 
from mosquito-borne disease and from pestilence itself.  To many in the post-Silent 
Spring era, it conjures images of a skull and cross bones, environmental destruction, and 
health hazards.  For farmers it has meant less worry and more profitable crops, and for 
consumers, more plentiful and appealing fruits and vegetables.  Over one billion pounds 
of pesticides are applied in the United States annually, now nearly 4 pounds per person.  
Their economic impact is enormous, and their health effects incompletely known.  One 
must begin any history of pesticides with the knowledge that its subject contains a loaded 
word, which elicits strong reactions on all sides. 
 The health concerns about pesticides have changed with the varying compounds 
and uses, and also with the state of scientific understanding.  Initial worries generally 
regarded the immediate and poisonous effects of pesticides, and only later did concerns 
about chronic pesticide exposure arise.  Essential to this changing focus were improved 
quantitative methods that allowed researchers and regulators to measure human pesticide 
exposure at levels below previous limits of detection.  Additionally, advancing 
epidemiological and animal studies revealed pesticides’ more subtle health effects.  In 
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this paper I focus on an instructive yet contentious example of this transition in a group of 
insecticides commonly known as the organophosphates (OPs).  Acute neurological 
poisoning from OPs has long been recognized; still, only since the mid-1980s have 
investigators seriously examined the long-term effects of OPs on brain development.  
Expanding evidence caused many scientists to suspect early-life exposure to even low 
levels of some organophosphates created subtle, but permanent, nervous system deficits. 
This phenomenon, known as developmental neurotoxicity (DNT), became a key issue in 
the understanding and regulation of not only insecticides, but also chemicals in general.  
 The recent history of organophosphates, particularly regarding developmental 
neurotoxicity, includes a landmark epistemological shift within the realm of chemical 
regulation and our understanding of risk.  This transition came in the form of the 1996 
Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA), which mandated that the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) change the way it examined pesticides’ health risks.  Former standards 
specified a risk/benefit calculation in which a pesticide’s health risks were to be balanced 
against its economic benefits.  The EPA operated under a familiar toxicology assumption 
that if studies showed no conclusive evidence of toxicity, no toxicity existed.  This idea 
stood in contrast to the general principles of medicine and public health, fields devoted to 
preventing or forestalling adverse health consequences even in the face of uncertain 
evidence.  Beginning in the 1980s, environmental health specialists began pushing for the 
application of a “precautionary principle” for pesticides and later played a major role in 
shaping the FQPA.  The clearest evidence of the precautionary principle at work in the 
FQPA is the incorporation of a ten-fold safety factor for pesticide tolerances (the level of 
acceptable pesticide residue remaining in food).  This safety factor, included to protect 
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infants and children, could only be removed if “reliable data” demonstrated a lower 
margin of safety for this age group [2].  Congress, armed with a reasonable suspicion of 
pesticide’s harm to children and acknowledging that standards based on current studies 
were inadequate, voted to act in a surprisingly precautionary manner.  This breakthrough 
legislation turned traditional risk assessment on its head by mandating a reduction in 
pesticide exposure and forcing industry to prove that higher exposures were safe.  It also 
removed the prior risk/benefit paradigm and instead based regulatory decisions solely on 
health [2].  Finally, the inclusion of the safety factor, partially aimed toward 
developmental toxicities, effectively reversed pesticides’ risk calculus and reignited the 
fierce debate about the role of science in pesticide regulation. 
Though the environmental, entomological, industrial, governmental, and medical 
literature on insecticides is enormous, and though their early history is well studied, 
health historians offer little attention to developments since 1980.  Silent Spring’s 
publication in 1962 produced a minor flurry of historical interest in the ensuing decades.  
For example, in 1975 James Whorton wrote Before Silent Spring, which covers the 
history of pesticides from antiquity to the introduction of DDT and particularly 
concentrates on the early-twentieth-century [1].  Thomas Dunlap’s DDT:  Scientists, 
Citizens, and Public Policy, published in 1981, provides a detailed history of this famous 
and infamous pesticide [3].  Silent Spring’s popularity afforded health historians the 
opportunity to write about the history of pesticides for a broader audience, yet historical 
accounts diminish after the 1980s. 
Recent scholarship on organophosphates includes historian Linda Nash’s 2004 
article “The Fruits of Ill-Health: Pesticides and Worker’s Bodies in Post-World War II 
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California,” [4] and a 2006 book on California agriculture and health, Inescapable 
Ecologies [5].  Edmund Russell’s 2001 book, War and Nature: Fighting Humans and 
Insects with Chemicals from World War I to Silent Spring, illustrates the German and 
American military role in the development of organophosphates and other insecticides, as 
well as the martial marketing techniques used by manufacturers [6].  While the above 
works examine pesticides’ environmental destructiveness and acute health effects, little 
historical attention has been given to their chronic health consequences.  The most 
comprehensive narrative on this subject was written not by an historian, but by a 
professor of environmental policy, John Wargo.   In 1996 Wargo wrote Our Children’s 
Toxic Legacy: How Science and Law Fail to Protect Us from Pesticides, which offers an 
introduction to adverse health risks from chronic pesticide exposure as well as an 
overview of recent pesticide policy and regulation [7].   
 In this paper I aspire to contribute to the historical understanding of pesticides and 
health.  Particular attention is warranted on the less studied chronic and non-cancer 
effects of pesticides, perhaps best highlighted through the case study of organophosphates 
and developmental neurotoxicity.  The timeframe examined is necessarily broad, given 
that organophosphate use spans over sixty years and associated chronic adverse effects 
from such use span over forty; nonetheless, I confine much of the scientific and policy 
study to the decade following the enactment of the Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA) 
in 1996.  There are two key events in the recent history of organophosphate regulation: 
the 1993 publication of the National Academy of Sciences’ report Pesticides in the Diet 
of Infants and Children, and the 1996 legislation of the FQPA [2, 8].  The NAS report first 
raised public consciousness about the possible dangers of OPs to children from 
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developmental neurotoxicity, while the FQPA was the first significant law regarding 
pesticides in half a century.  
 I concentrate particularly on the past decade because it remains relatively 
unexamined from a historical perspective and because the implementation of the FQPA 
posed unique regulatory and public health questions.  These questions, as I will explore, 
marked a profound change in the scientific and medical exploration of environmental 
toxins.  As evidenced by the alphabet soup of government abbreviations in the above 
paragraph, this study focuses on the recent controversy in the United States, rather than a 
wider international scope, for American decisions on pesticide regulation carry 
widespread influence throughout much of the world.  In doing so I intend to exemplify a 
particular application of the precautionary principle, rather than perform a comparative 
analysis. 
Even from the limited perspective offered in this paper, the recent history of 
organophosphates is complex and somewhat daunting.  Their numbers alone are 
impressive.  Each year about sixty million pounds of OPs are applied to roughly sixty 
million acres of land in the United States [9].  Thousands of researchers across the country 
dedicate themselves to the study of these pesticides’ myriad effects, and hundreds of 
employees of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) crunch numbers to inform 
regulatory decisions.  Millions of farmers, homeowners, and exterminators use these 
insecticides daily, and billions of people worldwide experience benefits and harms from 
their use.  Economically, the pesticide industry alone generates $11 billion per year [10].  
In the United States, entrenched forces on all sides of the pesticide debate compete for 
greater influence over pesticide regulation.  Industry groups like CropLife America 
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(formerly the American Crop Protection Association, and before that the National 
Agricultural Chemicals Association) [11] and the American Farm Bureau Federation 
(AFBF) [12] compete with environmental and public health groups like the Environmental 
Working Group (EWG) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) in the 
bureaucratic, legal, and public relations arenas.  
The actors above are not those traditionally seen in medical history.  Furthermore, 
one sees few physicians, no patients, not even disease.  Yet all parties have a significant 
impact on individuals’ health, albeit on a subclinical level.  The history of environmental 
health takes place largely outside the clinic and away from the hospital, and its historical 
documentation has only recently begun.  The story of developmental neurotoxicity from 
organophosphate pesticides is instructive into the nature of environmental health history, 
and its sheer diversity of actors underscores the broad nature of environmental health 
itself.  
In addition to the EPA, more traditional actors are involved in the pesticide story 
as well.  The National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS), one of 27 
branches of the National Institute of Health (NIH), performs independent research and 
distributes research funding to toxicologists and environmental health scientists at 
medical and public health schools across the country.  NIEHS maintains an open-access 
research journal called Environmental Health Perspectives, where much of the recent 
health literature on organophosphates can be found.  Furthermore, state programs, 
especially California’s Department of Pesticide Regulation, are the source of many new 
initiatives on pesticides.  These interest groups are considerably aided by physician 
participation in nearly all of them. 
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Historians Gregg Mitman, Michelle Murphy, and Christopher Sellers, in their 
introduction to the 2004 edition of the journal Osiris, entitled Landscapes of Exposure, 
argue that “it will become increasingly difficult to write the history of modern public 
health without asking many more questions about environment, ecology, and place” [13].  
Recent works, including David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz’s Deceit and Denial: The 
Deadly Politics of Industrial Pollution [14], Christopher Sellers’s Hazards of the Job: 
From Industrial Disease to Environmental Health Sciences [15], and Sheldon Krimsky’s 
The Scientific and Social Origins of the Environmental Endocrine Hypothesis focus on 
some of the environmental determinants of health.  Robert Gottlieb’s Forcing the Spring: 
The Transformation of the American Environmental Movement [16] and sociologist Robert 
Bullard’s Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality [17] address the role 
health has played in the environmental movement. Though I address the 
organophosphates from a medical, public health, and policy perspective, their story is 
inherently environmental as well.  OP-induced illness is caused by external 
environmental factors, and the levels of exposure depend on the complex mixture of 
people, pesticides, and their environment. 
The toxicology of organophosphates has become increasingly relevant.  Public 
concern about the environment and chemicals, particularly pesticides, continues to grow.  
This is evidenced by the expanding market for organic food and “green chemistry,” as 
well as the proliferation of groups claiming environmental causes for diseases such as 
autism, asthma, cancer, and infertility.  As scientists and citizens acquire greater 
sophistication about the risks of synthetic chemicals, so must historians, even amateur 
ones.  Here I will depict the growing complexity of the scientific evidence, regulation, 
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and debate surrounding OPs and place into perspective the expanding concerns for 
pesticides’ low-level effects.  I hope, in a larger sense, to play a role in the movement 
reconnecting our understanding of health to our place in the natural world. 
Comprehensive background sections are included to highlight the role of 
environmental health in medicine and to provide context for a relatively unfamiliar topic 
to many in the historical field.  These sections consist of the phenomenon of 
developmental neurotoxicity, including a brief case-study of lead poisoning; the 
organophosphates’ place in the history of insecticides; and the early history of OPs.  The 
main body of analysis occurs in the more recent sections, which deal with the origins of 
the FQPA, the initial reaction to its implementation, and the lasting effects and 
controversies. 
 
Developmental Toxicology of Organophosphates 
You too can be a toxicologist in two easy lessons, each of ten years. 
-Arnold J. Lehman (circa 1955), Chief Toxicologist at the FDA [18] 
 The organophosphates comprise a group of more than thirty insecticides that are 
some of the most widely used in the world.  They are also considered the most toxic to 
humans.  Like all chemical insecticides, the OPs function by attacking insects’ nervous 
systems [19].  In the same way organophosphates are toxic to insects, inhibiting the 
breakdown of the neurotransmitter acetylcholine, they are also neurotoxic to humans.  In 
1932 German chemist Willy Lange and his graduate student, Gerde von Krueger, first 
described symptoms of acute organophosphate exposure, noting “a feeling of pressure to 
the larynx and difficulty breathing,” followed by a “disturbance in consciousness” and 
“blurred vision” [20].  In the ensuing decades, scientists have so thoroughly elucidated the 
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mechanism and effects of OPs that medical schools now use them as classic examples of 
nervous system dysfunction when teaching pharmacology and neurology.  Yet according 
to the editors of a comprehensive textbook on organophosphate toxicology published in 
2006, "although the literature on OP... insecticides is seemingly exhaustive and 
systematic, this is not the case” [20].  Private industry, whose data remain outside the 
public domain, has carried out much of the research on OPs.  Furthermore, these authors 
identify a glaring omission in the body of research: nearly all toxicology testing has been 
on adult organisms; very few studies focus on children and developing animals. 
During the 1980s many pediatricians, toxicologists, and environmental health 
scientists developed concerns about whether standard toxicology tests, used in 
determining the allowable exposure levels set by the Environmental Protection Agency, 
were adequate enough to protect children’s health.  Research in the 1970s and early 
1980s on childhood lead poisoning showed that older studies and guidelines had 
underestimated children’s special risk and sensitivity to lead.  This raised the question—
might children have heightened susceptibility to other chemicals, particularly to known 
toxicants like pesticides?  In 1988 Congress requested that the National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS) appoint a committee to review the topic of children’s exposure to 
pesticides.  The final report, entitled Pesticides in the Diet of Infants and Children, 
published in 1993, outlined a number of deficiencies in the regulation and testing of 
pesticides.  Among other issues the committee expressed “concern about the vulnerability 
of the developing human brain to any neurotoxic pesticides” [8].  Their concern stemmed 
from a rich field of research on lead, mercury, radiation, alcohol, and polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCBs), which suggested that early life exposure to environmental toxicants, 
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even at low doses, could cause permanent brain damage by interfering with the brain’s 
complex formation and maturation [21].  This phenomenon, called “developmental 
neurotoxicity,” would, in the 1990s, change the debate over organophosphates.  With 
further study, doses that toxicologists once thought harmless were regarded with 
suspicion due to deleterious effects on developing fetuses and children.  The standard 
pediatric dictum, “children are not little adults,” acquired new meaning regarding 
pesticides [8]. 
 The field of toxicology has its own dictum: “the dose makes the poison,” derived 
from the father of toxicology, Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim (1493-1541), 
better known as Paracelsus.  In the sixteenth century he wrote “Alle Ding sind Gift und 
nichts ohn Gift; alein die Dosis macht das ein Ding kein Gift ist [All substances are 
poisons; there is none which is not a poison.  The right dose differentiates a poison]” [18].   
This idea forms the basis of much of modern toxicology and pesticide regulation through 
the use of “thresholds” and dose-response curves, which will be discussed later.  Interests 
favoring weaker pesticide regulation also employ this dictum, arguing that small amounts 
of chemicals are inherently of low risk given their low dose.  For example, the Center for 
Consumer Freedom, a self-described “nonprofit coalition of restaurants, food companies, 
and consumers” and opponent of “health care enforcers” and “meddling bureaucrats,” 
used this argument in a 2004 article opposing regulation of acrylamide, a carcinogen 
found in some foods.  “The dose makes the poison,” they argue, “practically every 
substance on earth (including water and Vitamin C) can kill you if it's concentrated 
enough.”  They claim that to experience “any real danger from acrylamide,” the average 
person would have to eat over “182 pounds of fries every day, for his or her entire life” 
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[22].  Many industry organizations, when opposing pesticide regulation, employ similar 
claims that only outlandish exposures to pesticides can cause harm [7]. 
Many environmental health scientists contend that toxicology’s traditional dictum 
is no longer appropriate in describing the risks of some heavy metals, like mercury and 
lead, and many pesticides [23-25].  On the most basic level, scientists and regulators often 
lack adequate knowledge of “the dose,” i.e. the true level of human exposure, and “the 
poison,” i.e. the full toxicity.  Better measurement methods and more systematic testing 
for OPs in food, water, dwellings, and people have shown that older sampling methods 
often underestimated people’s true pesticide exposure, or “dose” [7].  In terms of toxicity, 
scientists have found that supposed threshold doses, the levels below which no adverse 
effects are seen, apply differently to developing organisms than to adults.  This difference 
exists largely because of the dependency of a threshold dose on the effect being 
measured.   
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) determines an acceptable level of 
risk by reviewing toxicology studies in which scientists give animals incremental doses 
of a chemical and then monitor for a proscribed set of effects.  The highest dose at which 
the studies show no effect is termed the no-observed-adverse-effect-level (NOAEL), and 
is important in setting the human exposure limit for that pesticide.  If the studies do not 
look for a certain effect, however, the NOAEL cannot account for it.  Few EPA-reviewed 
studies examine developing animals or look for subclinical neurological dysfunction, 
despite ample evidence of harm from outside literature, resulting in a NOAEL and other 
thresholds that effectively ignore developmental neurotoxicity.  The title of this thesis, 
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“No Observed Adverse Effects,” reflects not the absence of harmful effects but rather the 
unmeasured, at least in a regulatory sense, harmful effects of OPs on developing brains. 
 
Environment in Medicine 
Environmental health as a field grew from the work of industrial hygienists, 
sanitarians, and occupational medicine physicians in the early twentieth century.  Prior to 
this time, physicians and the lay public often regarded the environment and human health 
as closely interlinked. Vapors and miasma in the ambient air, as one example, were 
considered the cause of malaria (mal’aria or “bad air”), cholera, tuberculosis, and many 
other diseases before the acceptance of the germ theory [7, 26].  Climate, weather, and 
geography all influenced physicians’ diagnoses, and workers of the era worried about the 
fumes, dust, and smoke they experienced on the job, despite lacking knowledge or proof 
of their toxicity [27]. 
 The rise of reductionism in medicine around the turn of the twentieth century 
slowly separated disease from its surroundings.  Illness came to exist only to the extent to 
which it could be measured, often by limited means, and the causative role of bad air, 
dust, and odor disappeared with the ascendance of bacteriology.  The rise of bacteriology, 
however, paradoxically reinforced in the public’s mind the importance of environmental 
sanitation, even as microbiological principles shifted physician’s concerns from the 
economic, social, and environmental context to the individual level [26]. The relatively 
marginalized field of occupational health, called industrial hygiene in the early 1900s, 
became one of the last remaining bridges of environmental causality [4].  In Deceit and 
Denial, historians David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz detail the works of Alice 
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Hamilton and Yandell Henderson in the early twentieth century in connecting workers’ 
exposures to lead and other chemicals to their diseases [14].  Yet, industrial hygiene as a 
profession later embraced the modern ideals of the industrial architecture it served, as the 
scope of the discipline narrowed and it neglected its earlier ties to environmental 
medicine.  Measurements, laboratory investigations, and narrow statistical analysis were 
all that could be relied upon, while workers' observations and intuitions about health were 
generally discounted or overlooked.  Occupational medicine, however, remained unique 
among the medical disciplines in that it never completely abandoned its focus on how the 
environment, albeit the work environment, affected health [4]. 
 In describing lead’s transition from a strictly occupational health issue to a broader 
environmental health concern, Rosner and Markowitz argue that, until the early 1970s, 
the roots of the two fields were “essentially distinct:  occupational health issues were seen 
as of interest only to workers and some of their unions, isolated beyond the gates of the 
factory, in the cauldron of American industrial production” [14].  In contrast, the largely 
middle class environmental movement was more concerned with protecting wilderness 
and natural areas from human encroachment and despoilment [28].  As the environmental 
movement matured, however, these two disciplines, occupational and environmental 
health, became tightly interlinked.  
 In the mid-twentieth century, with much of infectious disease "conquered," a shift 
in medicine from acute to chronic diseases, and the increasingly visible problem of 
industrial waste, Americans shifted their concerns to the hazards of pollution and 
synthetic chemicals [16, 26].  Doctors, and more frequently environmental activists, realized 
that workers were not the only ones susceptible to toxic substances, and that these 
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chemicals could pass beyond factory walls to pose dangers to the general population [15].  
In the 1960s, Citizens organized around local toxic waste threats, and older conservation 
organizations like the Sierra Club and the Audubon Society often leant their support [16].  
Rachel Carson’s publication of Silent Spring in 1962 brought pesticides, particularly 
DDT, to the forefront of the environmental movement [29].  The book, largely a synthesis 
of the burgeoning research on ecology and environmental toxicology, detailed the myriad 
effects of organochlorine and organophosphate pesticides on humans and wildlife.  
Concerns about organochlorine pesticides and other chemicals, along with air and water 
quality led to the creation of the EPA in 1970, a year that also marked the first Earth Day, 
regarded as a watershed event for the environmental movement [16]. 
 In the 1980s, the momentum of the environmental movement, along with the 
regulation it generated, inspired the formation of opposition organizations, business 
roundtables, and politicians decrying the growing bureaucracy and loss of individual 
rights.  These groups found support in President Ronald Reagan’s administration, and 
gained coordination through his successor’s Council on Competitiveness.  In 1994, their 
campaign for regulatory relief reached its zenith with the election of a Republican 
Congress and its Contract with America [7].  It was in this milieu of strong advocates for 
children’s health and the environment on one side and intense industry and political 
opposition on the other that this Congress passed the landmark FQPA just two years later 
by unanimous vote. 
Mittman et al. argue that “environment and health have long been seen as having 
separate histories” [13].  The EPA, for example, is a major player in nearly all modern 
environmental histories, yet is virtually absent in the health literature, despite its position 
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as primary regulator of pesticides and other toxic substances.  Perhaps because of its 
place as a separate agency outside the Department of Health and Human Services, its role 
in public health is frequently overlooked.  At its inception, more than one-tenth of the 
EPA’s employees were commissioned members of the US Public Health Service [30].  
Today, the percentage is much lower as more employees now come from the fields of 
law, policy, and economics. 
Medical historian Christopher Sellers, in his paper “The Dearth of the Clinic: 
Lead, Air, and Agency in Twentieth Century America,” writes that “scholars of 
twentieth-century medicine and public health are only beginning to come to grips with 
the resurgent biomedical attention to the environment...” [27].  He further urges “medical 
historians’ attention toward environments—workplaces, homes, and the outdoors” and to 
the “proliferating linkages between chronic degenerative disease, subclinical toxicity, and 
environmental exposure” [27].  While toxicologists, physicians, and environmental health 
scientists, as well as lay-activists and industry employees, have directed increasing 
amounts of attention to the subclinical effects of insecticides and other chemicals, health 
historians have only recently addressed this development.  
 
Developmental Neurotoxicity 
The human brain is composed of about 1 trillion nerve cells, called neurons, 
that are linked to each other in a web of staggering complexity; each neuron 
in the brain may be connected to as many as 1,000 other neurons…. If the 
brain is unfathomably complex, only the development of the brain is more so.  
From a ball of undifferentiated cells, an embryo with specialized tissues 
develops; trillions of neurons of dozens of specific types are born, migrate to 
the correct locations, and form the appropriate connections to carry out the 
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complex functions of the brain.... Killing just a handful of nerve cells early in 
development can potentially cause profound effects, since those cells might 
have been destined to produce millions of progeny cells, the absence of which 
will alter the pattern of connections among other neighboring cells. 
    -Joe Thornton, 2000, Pandoras Poison’s [31] 
As mentioned earlier, developmental neurotoxicity has been little studied in the 
historical literature partially because it is not a disease or an illness.  It does, however, 
have implications for many of the cognitive diseases of childhood, some of which appear 
to be increasing in prevalence, among them learning disabilities, dyslexia, mental 
retardation, attention deficit disorder, and autism [32].  Many neurologists and 
environmental health specialists believe that early life exposure to toxins may have a role 
as well in the neurodegenerative diseases of old age like Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s [33, 
34].  As frequently is the case in environmental health, clear causation between exposure 
and disease is difficult to establish, though evidence of these links is mounting [25].  If 
indeed developmental neurotoxicants, including lead, mercury, PCBs, and 
organophosphates, play any significant role in causing these childhood conditions, which 
affect 5-10% of American children, the potential for harm reduction is enormous [32].   
Toxicology, as noted earlier, has historically focused on dose effects.  Fetuses, 
infants, and children are often more susceptible to toxicants than adults partially due to 
age-related differences in absorption, metabolism, detoxification, and excretion [8].  
Traditional dose-response models can account for this type of variation.  Yet the 
remainder of developmental toxicity results from qualitative, rather than quantitative, 
differences, which according to the 1993 NAS report “are the consequences of exposures 
during special windows of vulnerability—brief periods early in development when 
exposure to a toxicant can permanently alter the structure or function of an organ system” 
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[8].  These effects are irreversible and require an entirely different way of thinking about 
toxicants. 
The notion that doses of chemicals considered safe for adults can cause defects in 
developing fetuses and children is well established in obstetrics [35].  Physicians minimize 
the number of medications that pregnant women take and avoid particular ones at all 
costs for fear of causing birth defects.  Yet this relationship was not always understood.  
Until the 1960s, despite prior evidence to the contrary, medical professors taught that the 
placenta constituted a perfect barrier “to toxic substances unless given in such high doses 
as to be lethal to the mother” [35].  British medical historian Ann Dally explores the 
reasons that this fallacy held sway over the medical profession, despite extensive studies 
by teratologists.  Our present knowledge about the vulnerability of the fetus is in some 
ways a rediscovery of past beliefs.  In ancient Carthage, bridal couples were forbidden 
alcohol for fear of damaging the child resulting from the wedding night [36].  Through 
much of the 18th and 19th centuries, doctors gave much attention to maternal impressions, 
the idea that the emotional state of a mother could harm her unborn child. 
 The use of thalidomide in Europe in the 1950s to treat morning sickness provides 
a tragic example of blindness to developmental toxicity and of the failure of 
communication across scientific disciplines.  Both medical professionals and the lay 
public at that time regarded thalidomide as a safe drug because there appeared to be no 
lethal dose [36].  However, evidence existed about the teratogenic potential of thalidomide 
prior to its use and, since the 1930s, teratologists had studied the ability of various 
chemicals to cause birth defects in mammals.  The public, however, was unaware, largely 
because much of the work had been published in specialty journals and received little 
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general medical coverage [36].  In 1961, however, four years after the drug first appeared 
on the market, physicians, beginning with Widukind Lenz in Germany, finally realized 
the potent teratogenic effects of thalidomide. Nearly 10,000 children in forty countries 
had been affected [37].  The experience tragically taught researchers that the timing of an 
exposure could be as important as the dose.  For instance, upper limb defects developed 
when exposures took place during days 27 to 30—exactly at the time when the upper 
limb buds normally appeared, and lower limb defects occurred with exposure during 
lower limb bud development [35].  These effects were extremely instructive about the role 
of chemical signaling in human development and to the sensitive nature of the developing 
embryo and fetus.  Reacting to these events in the early 1960s, the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) created guidelines that required new drugs to undergo extensive 
teratology tests on animals [38].   
While arm and leg defects are striking consequences of chemical interference, 
toxicants can cause analogous problems in less visible areas of the body like the brain.  
One toxicologist posited, decades after the FDA instituted their teratology testing rules, 
that if “thalidomide had also induced behavioral dysfunction, perhaps detection of 
functional [neurological] disorders would have been included” in these guidelines years 
earlier [39].  Yet in the early 1960s, the study of developmental neurotoxicity, or 
“behavioral teratology” as it was then called, was still very much in its infancy [40].  
Though researchers discovered this phenomenon later than most other forms of 
teratology, the nervous system is actually more sensitive to chemical insult than other 
organs.  Three principal reasons account for this heightened sensitivity.  First, the 
prolonged period of brain development, stretching from the first trimester of pregnancy to 
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several years after birth, presents a long window of exposure to potential toxins.  Second, 
the central nervous system has little capacity to repair damage, and thus early-life injury 
is often permanent.   Third, and perhaps most importantly, the nervous system is highly 
specialized and maturation depends on a complex series of nerve cell migrations and 
transformations, as opposed to organs like the liver and kidney are comprised of many 
thousands of identical units [41]. 
In 1961, Jack Werboff, a toxicologist, and Jacques Gottlieb, first documented the 
phenomenon of developmental neurotoxicity in rats exposed to anticonvulsant 
medications, but not until the late 1960s and early 1970s, when research on fetal alcohol 
syndrome showed that behavioral teratology was a widespread cause of mental 
retardation, did government regulators take notice [39].  In the late 1970s, toxicologists 
expanded their focus from pharmaceuticals to the neurodevelopmental effects of 
environmental and industrial toxins, particularly the heavy metals lead and mercury [39]. 
Studies on these metals provided the background for later work on organophosphates in 
the 1990s.  
 
The Case of Lead 
I have included this brief history of lead to illustrate the evolution in medical 
thinking as the clinical recognition of lead toxicity has progressed from overt to 
subclinical to subtle effects [42]. This is relevant because it parallels and anticipates the 
concerns about organophosphates over a decade later, and because it yields several 
important comparisons.  The discovery of lead’s toxicity proceeded along a familiar path 
among toxins, as effects were first noted in highly exposed workers, then in accidentally 
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poisoned children, later in patients with persistent deficits following poisoning and 
recovery, and finally at a subtle, population-level from low-level exposure during 
development. 
Lead is a natural element found abundantly in the Earth’s surface, yet it is a 
substance to which humans and other mammals have had little exposure evolutionarily, 
and hence developed little capacity for detoxification.  Physicians have known of lead’s 
acute neurotoxicity as far back as the ancient Romans, who used the metal extensively in 
plumbing, pewter, and fortified wine [43].  Around the turn of the twentieth century, paint 
manufacturers began using lead heavily in the United States and, in 1923, gasoline 
producers started adding tetraethyl lead to gasoline.  Rosner and Markowitz expose the 
lead industry’s willful ignorance and misleading campaigns about lead’s toxicity.  As 
early as 1921, the president of National Lead wrote in a letter to the dean of the Harvard 
Medical School that “fifty to sixty years” of experience had taught the industry that “lead 
is a poison” [14]. Within the next several years, the same company began an advertising 
campaign portraying lead as “the doctor’s assistant” and promoted the idea that “Lead 
helps guard your health” [14]. 
In the early 1900s, lead poisoning was regarded (if it was regarded at all) as an 
occupational hazard for lead miners and smelters.  By the early 1930s, however, 
pediatricians agreed that lead paint posed a hazard to children [44].  Consistent with the 
contemporaneous conception of toxicity, it was believed that if a child survived lead 
poisoning, he or she would recover completely [45]. Scientists have since learned that 
children develop lead poisoning at lower lead levels than adults largely because their 
blood-brain barrier is relatively permeable, which allows the metal to concentrate in their 
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central nervous system [8]. In 1991, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued 
a statement, entitled Preventing Lead Poisoning in Young Children.  “Since 1970, our 
understanding of childhood lead poisoning has changed substantially,” the CDC 
statement asserted.  “As investigators have used more sensitive measures and better study 
designs,” it said, “the generally recognized level for lead toxicity has progressively 
shifted downward. Before the mid-1960s, a level above 60 µg/dL was considered toxic.  
By 1978, the defined level of toxicity had declined 50% to 30 µg/dL” [45]. 
That standard has declined to 10 µg/dL today based on further research. What the 
“better study designs” revealed, was that acute toxicity was only the most obvious of 
lead’s effects.  The first inklings of this possibility arose in 1943 when physician 
Randolph Byers and psychologist Elizabeth Lord at Boston Children’s Hospital reported 
a case series showing that 19 of 20 children who had “recovered” from lead poisoning 
later failed high school or had behavioral problems [25].   
A landmark study in 1979 by Harvard pediatrian and psychiatrist Herbert 
Needleman marked a major turning point in scientific thinking about lead.  The study 
showed that children with lead levels between 20 to 40 µg/dL—now considered high, but 
well below the threshold at the time—had lower IQ scores and a higher incidence of 
“non-adaptive classroom behavior” than children with lower lead levels [46].  This study 
provided a new way to look at lead’s effects, particularly at subtle impairment of 
neurodevelopment [47].  Policymakers particularly paid attention to the real-world 
implications of the study, later outlined in the 1991 CDC report, which noted that “a shift 
in mean IQ score of 4-6 points... was associated with a substantial increase in the 
prevalence of children with severe deficits (that is, IQ scores less than 80)” and “an 
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absence of children who achieved superior function (that is, IQ scores greater than 125)” 
[45]. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the U.S. government mandated lead’s removal 
from paint and gasoline, based partially on Needleman’s findings and other lead data, 
though largely because lead could harm the new catalytic converters in cars, [43].  The 
tremendous environmental decline in lead over this period, considered one of the signal 
victories in the recent history of public health, allowed for a natural experiment [48].  A 
study published in 2002 found that from 1976 to 1999 the average child’s blood lead 
level dropped by 15.1 µg/dL, which, they calculated, raised IQ scores by about 2.2-4.7 
points [47].  This increase in IQ is nearly undetectable in an individual child, but its overall 
impacts on society are enormous.  Statistical and economic studies have determined that 
an IQ point has a great deal of economic value over a person’s life.  The authors 
calculated that the average increase in IQ generated about $56,000 in extra lifetime 
income for each child, which sums to hundreds of billions of dollars for the childhood 
population [47]. 
A study published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 2003 concluded 
that subtle neurological deficits arise at blood levels even below 10 µg/dL, the current 
standard [49].  Later studies have supported this finding, and further showed that the 
deficits seen below 10 µg/dL are greater than deficits at higher blood lead concentrations 
[25].  Based on the accumulated evidence, many lead experts now believe that no threshold 
effect exists for lead, that is, there is no level that does not produce a toxic effect [50].   
 Frequently in the history of environmental toxins, stakeholders standing to lose 
money through government regulation attempt to place blame upon the victim of a 
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poisoning rather than the toxicant.  A corollary of this strategy is to associate the disease 
with minorities and the poor so as to marginalize the problem and to minimize the risks 
perceived by the general population.  With increasing public awareness of lead poisoning 
in the 1950s, the Lead Industries Association (LIA) attempted to do just this by shifting 
the blame from the lead industry to the problem of poverty [44].  A 1952 LIA publication 
stated, “ childhood lead poisoning is essentially a problem of slum dwellings and 
relatively ignorant parents” [44].  Lack of food, another publication argued, might cause 
children to eat paint flakes, but even a “well-fed child may still be emotionally hungry 
because he does not receive as much loving attention as he needs,” in effect shifting the 
blame from a toxin in their products to purportedly negligent parents [44].     
In terms of organophosphates as well, physicians often placed blame upon the 
poisoned farmworker rather than the pesticide or its mode of use.  In 1964 the president 
of the California Medical Association, Ralph Teall, employed racial and economic 
stereotypes to do just this in a speech to the state legislature about pesticides. “People,” 
he said, referring to farmworkers, “just must be more careful about their personal hygiene 
if they are going to avoid any difficulty” with pesticides [4].  In general lawmakers have 
passed little legislation protecting farmworkers unless worried and vocal consumers 
perceived risks to themselves as well.  For example, in the 1960s Cesar Chavez and the 
United Farm Workers’ were most successful when they linked farmworker health and 
safety to public fear of the persistent organochlorine pesticides [16].  The lack of 
simultaneous attention to organophosphates, which posed far greater immediate risks to 
farmworkers, showed the importance of marginalization in avoiding attention and 
regulation [4].  Even as late as the 1990s, farmworkers, despite their higher exposures, 
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remained peripheral to the pesticide debate [16].  Though the 1996 FQPA centered on pre- 
and post-natal exposures, many environmental health experts agree that a focus on 
children is the easiest way to politically achieve pesticide reductions for farmworkers as 
well. 
 
Evolution of Pesticides and Pesticide Legislation 
 While Silent Spring brought the public’s attention to pesticides on an 
unprecedented scale in 1962, farmers have used insecticides, and others have fretted 
about their effects, for over a century.  As new pesticides were developed, the pattern and 
spectrum of use changed, as did human and ecological concerns.  I will outline several of 
the primary classes of insecticide to give a sense of the organophosphates’ place in 
history.  Insecticides can be divided into a “first generation,” generally those used prior to 
the 1940s and easily derived from natural sources, and a “second generation,” or the 
synthetic organics, which gained widespread use after World War II and revolutionized 
the farm industry [51].  Organophosphates are a member of the latter, having been 
produced in the laboratories of Nazi Germany and applied extensively beginning in the 
1950s. 
The first generation insecticides included heavy metals, such as lead, copper, 
arsenic, and mercury, as well as plant-derived compounds including nicotine, rotenone, 
pyrethrins, and lime [51].  James Whorton notes in Before Silent Spring that though the 
public of the 1970s considered their era the beginning of the pesticide controversy, the 
widespread use of Paris green (copper acetoarsenite) and lead arsenate incited fierce 
disputes at the end of the nineteenth century [1]. For example, in 1891 the New York Times 
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created a public panic with a headline entitled “Poison Grapes for Sale,” which were 
incorrectly believed to contain high residues of arsenic [3].   Yet farmers did use a great 
deal of both lead and arsenic on crops of the era, and the medical literature contains many 
reports of farm-worker poisoning from these metals.  The government’s management of 
consumer risks in the 1920s illustrated its affinity and close relationship with industry.  
As the center of the American apple business shifted from upstate New York to the drier 
valleys of Washington State, food inspectors found higher levels of lead arsenate dust 
remaining on fruit.  Rather than informing the public, which they feared would create 
another panic, government regulators instead gently pressured growers over a period of 
years only to improve application and handling techniques to minimize residual dust [3]. 
The early twentieth century was a time when little was known about the health 
risks of pesticides other than acute poisoning, and business interests generally 
outweighed health concerns.  In 1910 Congress, concerned with the lead and arsenate 
insecticides, passed the Insecticide Act, which was the first American law governing 
pesticide use.  Yet this law was intended to ensure pesticide purity, concentration, and 
efficacy, rather than to safeguard health [7].  Even as late as 1927, the government had 
still not evaluated the chronic health consequences of the lead and arsenical pesticides [7].  
The earlier Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 had little initial role in governing 
insecticides.  It did, however, create a division at the Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
for food testing and enforcement that later assumed responsibility for pesticide control.  
Health advocates applauded the decision to regulate pesticide residues in food, yet argued 
that the task should not remain with the USDA, which was primarily a service and 
booster agency for agriculture, [3].  In 1927, the Department separated its agricultural 
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research section from its enforcement one, which it renamed the Food, Drug, and 
Insecticide Division (later shortened in 1930 to the Food and Drug Administration, or 
FDA) [52].  Not until 1940, two years after the passage of the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetics Act (FFDCA), did Congress move the regulation of pesticide residues away 
from the USDA to a health-centered agency [52].  
I mention briefly the pyrethroid class of insecticides because its uses have grown 
substantially in recent years and because it is the only major group to span both the first 
and second generations.  Pyrethrins, the prototypes of the class, derive from the 
pyrethrum flower, a member of the chrysanthemum family, originally found in Persia and 
the Caucasus region [1].  People in these areas have used the crushed petals to control 
body lice since before the nineteenth century, and commercial production of pyrethrins 
began in the 1840s.  In keeping with the major expansion of insecticide production during 
World War II, Japan became a major producer during the war, which gave it a strategic 
advantage when fighting in malarial areas.  After the war, the pyrethrins, because of their 
relative weakness and expense, remained a small component of the American insecticide 
market, despite their relative safety.  Over the next several decades, scientists developed 
synthetic, more stable and effective, versions of these substances, called pyrethroids, 
which, following the bans on many OCs and OPs, have become among the most widely 
used indoor and outdoor insecticides in the U.S.  They now account for about one quarter 
of the world insecticide market [53]. 
 The second generation of insecticides, the synthetic wonders of the laboratory, 
were to pest control of the mid-century what antibiotics were to medicine.  Stronger than 
nicotine or pyrethrins, lacking the obvious health dangers of lead or arsenic, and 
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possessing an efficacy lasting for months after application, the organochlorine pesticides 
(OCs), such as DDT, dieldrin, and chlordane, seemed the solution to the pest control 
problem.  DDT’s history is, in many ways, emblematic of the problems of nearly all of 
the organochlorine pesticides.  Developed in the 1870s, DDT’s insecticidal properties 
were not discovered until World War II, when military scientists, in a frantic quest to 
control malaria-transmitting mosquitoes and typhus-carrying lice, tested hundreds of 
potential compounds for their insect-killing capabilities.  DDT proved extremely 
effective, and American companies manufactured over 2 million pounds per month in 
1944, allowing the United States to spray entire Pacific islands before invasion [7]. 
After the war, despite the consternation of many government scientists, DDT was 
used extensively in agriculture, forestry, and public health programs.  By 1955 more than 
90% of all U.S. agricultural pesticides were synthetic organic compounds, and in 1961 
DDT was registered for use on 334 crops [8].  DDT’s long-lasting insecticidal nature, part 
of the reason it was so appealing, also accounted for a potential danger:  its extreme 
persistence in the environment.  Even when first discovered, scientists knew something of 
DDT’s ability to concentrate in human tissue and breast milk, though little was known 
about the consequences.  Biologists later found that DDT and other organochlorines 
appeared in exponentially greater doses at sequentially higher stages of the food chain, 
causing ecological disruption.  At the same time, medical researchers increasingly 
discovered human health risks [3].  Rachel Carson, as discussed earlier, eloquently 
outlined these concerns first in a series of articles in the New Yorker, and later in her book 
Silent Spring [29].  The controversy that ensued eventually caused the United States to ban 
the use of DDT in 1973, and the remaining organochlorines shortly after. 
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Bioaccumulation was not the only issue facing the OCs, a more immediate problem was 
insect resistance.  Just as bacteria developed defenses to the widespread use of the 
antibiotic “wonder drugs” of the 1950s, insects acquired their own mechanisms of 
evading the organochlorines’ attack [7].  
 During the post-war explosion of new pesticides, many in government realized 
that stronger regulation was needed to cope with the growing production and use of these 
new chemicals.  In early 1947, the USDA estimated that 25,000 pesticide products had 
been licensed under the Insecticide Act, and projected that many more would soon arrive.  
In response to USDA’s difficulties in tracking the pesticides already in use, Congress 
passed the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) that same year, 
mandating that manufacturers register any “economic poisons” with the USDA [7].  Yet 
FIFRA lacked a strong enforcement arm, and its primary means of regulation was simply 
labeling of pesticides.  The labels implied to consumers that they could avoid adverse 
health consequences if they followed instructions on the product.  Yet the act contained 
little provision for examining human or ecological health risks.  If a product was found to 
induce harm to humans even when used properly, the Secretary of Agriculture would 
declare it “misbranded” [7].  Even then the Secretary was forced to register the pesticide 
for use, albeit “under protest” [7].   
 FIFRA remained the primary law governing insecticide use—other than the 1938 
FFDCA, which mandated that the FDA regulate pesticide food residues—until 1954, 
when the Miller Pesticide Amendment to the FFDCA, named after Congressman Arthur 
Miller of Nebraska, gave the FDA authority to establish maximum “tolerances” of 
allowable pesticide contamination on raw, unprocessed foods [52].  The Miller 
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Amendment was the first major pesticide law to integrally consider health, though the 
law allowed the FDA to consider the economic costs to farmers and consumers when 
making tolerance decisions [7].  The creation of FIFRA and the Miller Amendment split 
pesticide regulation into two fragments, putting the USDA in charge of pesticide 
registration and the FDA in charge of pesticide food tolerances.  The FDA, given the 
responsibility of protecting health, gained no authority to require tests of pesticide safety 
from manufacturers and had little data on which to base its decisions.  The USDA, on the 
other hand, required only efficacy data, rather than safety studies [7]. 
 One final piece of legislation from the 1950s deserves mention for its lasting 
importance in the pesticide debate.  In 1958 Congress passed the Food Additives 
Amendment to the FFDCA following a series of food safety hearings led by 
Congressman James Delaney of New York.  The amendment gave the FDA the power to 
regulate not only pesticide residues in raw foods, but also residues in the increasingly 
popular processed foods.  The act is more notable because it contained the most 
controversial provision in pre-FQPA pesticide history, known as the “Delaney Clause” 
[52].  The initially unassuming clause stated that the FDA should prohibit any pesticide 
detectable after the processing of food (thereby a food additive) and shown to “induce 
cancer” [7].  This strict guideline, later feared and reviled by pesticide manufacturers, 
stood in stark contrast to the risk/benefit situation allowed in raw foods.  Another 
idiosyncrasy of this clause is that it applied only to cancer and not to the many other 
kinds of adverse effects that pesticides can cause.  As I will explain later, abolishing this 
clause for pesticides was the food industry’s dominant reason for supporting the FQPA.   
In addition to the above amendments to the FFDCA (the residue side), Congress 
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passed several amendments to FIFRA (the registration side) that set the stage for the 1996 
Food Quality Protection Act.  A 1964 amendment finally gave the USDA the authority to 
terminate, or “cancel,” a pesticide’s registration.  This power became important within 
the next decade when the newly formed EPA cancelled DDT and many other 
organochlorines [7].  In 1972 another amendment to FIFRA mandated that the focus of 
pesticide registration move from efficacy to safety, particularly with regard to health and 
the environment.  The nascent EPA received the enormous new responsibility of 
assessing health risks for all new and old pesticides with very little data [7].  Over the next 
two decades, the agency frequently came under fire from all sides for failing to meet 
congressionally imposed deadlines for pesticide reregistration.   This perpetual state of 
disarray became one of the primary motivators for Congress in passing the strong 
legislation of the FQPA. 
 Farmers and insecticide manufacturers lost many organochlorines to bans (and 
insect resistance) through the 1970s.  In their search for substitutes, they increasingly 
turned to two other groups of insecticides already in use, the carbamates (CMs) and the 
organophosphates (OPs), which have since become the most widely used insecticides in 
the world.  These pesticides held a distinct advantage over DDT and the other 
organochlorines.  Their relatively short life span allowed them to degraded with exposure 
to the elements and kept them from concentrating in body tissues.  Yet they also had a 
major drawback:  severe nervous system toxicity following exposure.  Toxicologists 
often consider CMs and OPs together because they both act on the insect and mammalian 
enzyme, acetylcholinesterase (AChE).  This enzyme normally terminates the signals 
between some types of neurons by breaking apart the neurotransmitter acetylcholine.  
  
31
31
When carbamates (reversibly) and organophosphates (irreversibly) inactivate AChE, 
acetylcholine over-stimulates the receiving nerve cell, causing death in insects and 
nervous system, cardiac, and respiratory dysfunction in humans [20].   
 
Organophosphate Pesticides 
Symptoms in [mice and rats] started with an increase in respiration, 
followed soon by unsteadiness, lack of coordination, and scattered muscular 
twitches.  Defecation, urination, lacrimation, and salivation occurred 
regularly.  The severity of symptoms rapidly increased to prostration with 
generalized muscular fibrillations, body twitchings and tonic and clonic 
convulsions, followed by death apparently due to respiratory failure of 
peripheral origin.  The heart continued to beat 2 to 3 minutes after cessation 
of respiration.  
-K.P. DuBois et al., “Studies on the Toxicity and 
Mechanism of Action of Parathion.” 1949 
Not all organophosphates act on cholinesterase or function as pesticides, though 
all OPs share one thing in common, which is a characteristic phosphate linked to several 
carbon atoms, hence the term organo-phosphate [20].  Out of the thousands of OPs created 
after 1945, over forty are insecticidal.  While all of these on the same enzyme, they often 
differ markedly in their potential for acute and chronic neurotoxicity, as well as their 
level of persistence in the environment. 
Organophosphorus compounds were synthesized by Lassaigne in the early 1800s 
by mixing alcohol with phosphoric acid [54], but Phillipe de Clermont, in 1854, first 
described the synthesis of an organophosphate in a report to the French Academy of 
Sciences [20]. Not until 1932, were their potential effect on the nervous system discovered, 
when Willy Lange and Gerde von Kruger noticed visual changes while testing dimethyl 
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and diethyl phosphorofluoridate [54].  Later in the 1930s, Gerhard Schrader, a chemist at 
the German firm I.G. Farben and the father of modern organophosphates, began 
exploring their insecticidal potential.  In 1937, Schrader, at the request of the Nazi 
government and I.G. Farben, traveled to Berlin to demonstrate these compounds’ 
potential as chemical warfare agents.  The Germans soon found certain OPs to be 
extremely potent nerve agents and created the G series compounds (tabun, sarin, and 
soman), which were not deployed in World War II [6].   
British chemists at Cambridge University, Hamilton McCombie and Bernard 
Saunders, in 1941 independently synthesized a neurotoxic, though less potent, 
organophosphate of their own, called diisopropyl fluorophosphate (DFP).  As part of the 
war effort, Cambridge chemists routinely tested compounds on themselves.   Among 
them was Fred Pattison who, in a later interview, noted that he became “virtually blind 
for about 10 days” following an intentional exposure to DFP [55].  In the 1950s, the United 
Kingdom created another nerve agent, called VX, which had many times the potency of 
the G series, and has never been used militarily.  Belying the image of organophosphates 
as short acting and rapidly dissipating, the military referred to VX as a “terrain-denying” 
compound because it persisted in target areas for days to weeks after application [20].  The 
nerve gas roots of the organophosphate pesticides have carried potent symbolic meaning 
throughout the rest of their history.  After an accidental release of VX gas killed 
thousands of nearby sheep in 1968, historian Linda Nash notes that “farmworker 
advocates began referring to agricultural spraying as ‘chemical warfare’ and to parathion 
as a ‘nerve gas’” [4]. 
  Despite knowledge of DFP, Americans knew little of OPs as insecticides until the 
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end of World War II, when government investigators discovered Schrader’s laboratory. 
Schrader himself then wrote an unclassified American report outlining OPs’ insecticidal 
activity, including details about some of the more than 2000 OPs his laboratory had 
synthesized. American companies capitalized on this discovery and, free of patent or 
licensing restrictions, began manufacturing large quantities of organophosphate 
insecticides, beginning with Monsanto’s TEPP in 1946 [6].  Dozens of OP insecticides 
followed, including parathion in 1949, and malathion and azinphos-methyl in the 1950s 
[4].  Though more dangerous to use than the aforementioned organochlorines, OPs gained 
popularity through the 1950s due to their low cost and broader insecticidal spectrum.   
Researchers found that parathion could kill all insect species against which it was tested. 
Farmers employed this property, using organophosphates to control “secondary” pests 
that were inherently resistant to DDT.  Farmers found another benefit in that plant roots 
absorbed the OPs and distributed the chemicals to the stems and leaves, which allowed 
for more systemic poisoning of insects [6]. 
During this time of rapid expansion, scientists were also at work determining the 
OPs’ mechanism and toxicity.  George Koelle and Alfred Gilman (later co-author of a 
prominent pharmacology textbook and father of Nobel-prize winner Alfred Gilman Jr.), 
pharmacologists in the Army Chemical Corps at Edgewood, Maryland, first identified 
organophosphates’ neurotoxic mechanism through its inhibitory effects on 
acetylcholinesterase [56]. The link between OP nerve gases and insecticides remained a 
prominent factor in research.  In 1953, the military Chemical Corps funded research at 
Johns Hopkins School of Medicine that tested nerve gases and parathion on human 
subjects, who often took days to recover [6].  For the next several decades, physicians 
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focused primarily on the acute effects of OP poisoning, largely unaware of any chronic 
and developmental consequences.  This despite University of Chicago toxicologist 
Kenneth Dubois’s conclusions in 1949 that “continued exposure to sublethal doses of 
parathion results in subacute poisoning in rats and suggests the possibility of a 
cumulative action by parathion in other animals” [57]. 
Doctors focused on acute OP poisoning for good reason, given its widespread 
prevalence and lethality, and because it was relatively difficult to diagnose.  Though the 
poisoning resulted in a characteristic physiological response, including sweating, 
salivation, tearing, vomiting, defecation, and difficulty breathing, less severe cases could 
be confused with other, more common, illnesses [20].  Physicians treated thousands of 
people, many of them farmworkers, for organophosphate poisoning in the 1950s and 
1960s, though likely many more went undiagnosed.  Berton Roueché, the famed medical 
writer for the New Yorker, wrote two “medical mysteries”—“The Dead Mosquitoes” and 
“The Fumigation Chamber”—with the surprise diagnosis of organophosphate poisoning, 
a testament to the pervasiveness, yet relative obscurity, of the affliction [58].   
One chronic complication from a number of organophosphates was particularly 
evident.  Few physicians could fail to realize the debilitating effects of organophophate-
induced delayed polyneuropathy (OPIDP).  Contrary to acute OP poisoning, its 
symptoms began several days to weeks after exposure and were caused by a breakdown 
in certain neurons and their myelin sheaths [59].  Scientists described the syndrome even 
before organophosphates began their work as insecticides, from an organophosphate 
solvent called tri-ortho-cresyl phosphate (TOCP).  In 1899, the first OPIDP outbreak of 
paralysis occurred in France after patients drank a TOCP-contaminated creosote oil 
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treatment for tuberculosis [60].  The syndrome gained notoriety in the United States during 
the late 1920s and early 1930s, when twenty to sixty thousand men in the South and 
Midwest developed pain and weakness in their arms and legs after drinking a medicinal 
beverage called “Ginger Jake.”  The drink, sold in drugstores, normally contained a 
Jamaican ginger extract with a high concentration of alcohol.  Poor white southerners 
frequently used Ginger Jake to circumvent prohibition laws [61]. One particular 
manufacturer found TOCP a cheaper additive than ginger extract, and men who received 
this adulterated form developed permanent neurological damage.  The scale of the 
tragedy was reflected in the blues music of the period, which frequently sang of the “Jake 
Leg” or “Jake Walk,” referring to the limping gait of the victims [61]. 
 Investigators later found that organophosphate pesticides, including dichlorvos 
and mipafox, could also produce OPIDP [54].  TOCP, unlike the OP pesticides, had no 
anti-cholinesterase activity, meaning that the syndrome was unrelated to the pesticides’ 
primary effects on cholinesterase.  Toxicologists first suspected the involvement of a 
separate enzyme, which they called neurotoxic esterase, though they now consider the 
syndrome related to an OP-induced breakdown in the cell’s support structure [20]. The 
case of OPIDP demonstrated that OPs have effects on the nervous system distinct from 
those on cholinesterase, the primary marker in OP regulation.  This independent 
mechanism foreshadowed the non-cholinergic consequences of developmental 
neurotoxicity over a half-century later.   
 Aside from the distinct syndrome of OPIDP and a related “intermediate 
syndrome,” the medical profession generally overlooked OPs’ potential for chronic 
neurotoxicity through the 1950s and early 1960s, despite increasing use and thousands of 
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poisonings.  Yet researchers recorded chronic effects in specialty journals, and reached a 
relatively small audience during this period.  A progression similar to lead is evident in 
the medical literature as acute effects were predominantly studied first, followed by 
chronic effects, then effects on children, and more recently effects on the developing 
nervous system.  In 1961, Australian pharmacologists, in a case study of 16 patients who 
had recovered from acute OP poisoning, noted residual neurological effects including 
“severe impairment of memory and difficulty concentrating” [62].  In 1962, Rachel Carson 
noted these first inklings of residual effects in Silent Spring [29].  Through the rest of the 
1960s, investigators increasingly looked for, and found, evidence of chronic sequelae 
from OP poisoning, particularly from occupational exposures [63, 64].  Toxicologists, too, 
were busy during this period.  Starting in 1963, scientists found evidence of more intense 
poisoning from malathion in young rats compared to adults [65].   
Findings of developmental neurotoxicity in OPs lagged somewhat behind those 
seen in lead.  A study done in 1977 showed neuromuscular impairment in adult rats after 
intra-uterine exposure to low doses of diazinon [66].  The next set of experiments, 
performed in the mid-1980s, revealed that fetal rats exposed to methyl parathion and 
parathion had “altered postnatal development of cholinergic neurons and... subtle 
alterations in selected behaviors of the offspring”[67, 68].  By the late 1980s, however, 
developmental neurotoxicity research on organophosphates remained in its infancy.  
Meanwhile, independent and EPA scientists had acquired extensive experience with 
neurodevelopmental effects from other substances, including lead, mercury, 
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), anti-seizure medications, and alcohol [69].   
In 1989 the state of knowledge had progressed far enough that the EPA held an 
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agency-wide workshop to create a standardized system testing to test for developmental 
toxicity.  Results from this workshop appeared in the journal Neurotoxicology and 
Teratology in 1990.  Although the article praised the agency for its forward thinking, it 
declared that American “regulatory agencies have been slow to take action,” noting that 
Great Britain and Japan began testing compounds for this problem in 1975 [21]. Prior to 
the workshop the EPA had no developmental neurotoxicity tests for OPs; rather, they 
required only one chronic neurotoxicity test—for delayed neurotoxicity (the type seen in 
the TOCP “ginger jake” paralysis) in adult hens—for this pesticide class [21].  In 1991, 
based on this workshop and the advice of its Science Advisory Panel (SAP), the EPA 
issued “generic” developmental neurotoxicity testing guidelines, though not specifically 
for organophosphates or other pesticides  [21].  Increased interest on the subject spurred 
university-based scientists to conduct further research, and by the time of the 1993 NAS 
report, researchers had published several studies on developmental neurotoxicity from 
organophosphates [70].  Yet despite these advancements, the EPA was slow to call for 
developmental neurotoxicity studies.  As late as 1998, the agency had reviewed only 
twelve DNT studies on insecticides. 
Aside from brewing concerns about developmental neurotoxicity, the early 1990s 
contained a shifting undercurrent in the momentum of pesticide regulation as a whole.  
As we will see, expanding scientific study and better data, on both pesticide exposure and 
adverse health effects, began to change the dominant paradigm from economics to health.  
The most public form of this shift, the publication of the 1993 NAS report Pesticides in 
the Diet of Infants and Children, brought wider attention to these chemicals and set the 
stage for the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act.  In the following pages, I chronicle the 
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promise and reality of this landmark piece of legislation and trace the growing influence 
of developmental neurotoxicity in the pesticide risk calculus. 
   
The 1996 Food Quality Protection Act 
This Act comes to our desk — to my desk and to our administration – with the 
support of farmers and environmentalists, consumer groups and agribusiness 
and the medical community. After more than a decade of work, these groups 
have come together to say with this bill, we do not have to choose between a 
clean environment and a safe food supply and a strong economy. 
-President Bill Clinton, August 3rd 1996, Bill Signing of HR. 1627 (FQPA) [71] 
 As I stated earlier, the two key events in the recent history of organophosphate 
pesticides include the 1993 NAS report and the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act.  In the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, many health officials, including toxicologists at the EPA, 
developed renewed interest in the toxicity of older pesticides following the realization 
that nearly all of the exposure data and animal studies had been conducted on adults, and 
that little attention had been given to the increased susceptibility, now well-documented, 
of infants, children, and fetuses [21, 72].  Based on these concerns, Congress requested that 
the National Academy of Sciences appoint a committee in 1988, as part of its National 
Research Council (NRC), to study “scientific and policy issues concerning pesticides in 
the diets of infants and children” [8].  Congress specifically charged the committee with 
determining the state of knowledge about exposures, the adequacy of the current laws, 
and, most relevant to this analysis, the “toxicological issues of greatest concern and in 
greatest need of further research” [8].  
In its report, published five years later, the committee found a number of 
deficiencies in the current regulatory system.  Fundamentally, the report noted that the 
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EPA lacked good exposure data and thus had poor estimates of children’s vulnerability to 
various pesticides.  From the existent data, however, they did find that children were 
exposed to quantitatively higher levels of pesticides than adults because they consumed 
more food and water relative to their body size, ate more of some types of pesticide-prone 
food—like apple juice and applesauce—and possessed immature detoxification systems 
[8].  These findings, while new to pesticide regulation, fit the traditional toxicological 
modeling of chemical exposure, inputs, and outputs.  Still the committee also noted what 
they termed “qualitative differences” in the effects of pesticides on children and adults, 
resulting from the state of growth and differentiation in the former.  In terms of 
developmental neurotoxicity these qualitative differences are most relevant, and indeed 
the report noted that studies “strongly suggest” that “exposure to neurotoxic compounds 
at levels believed to be safe for adults could result in permanent loss of brain function if it 
occurred during the prenatal and early childhood period of brain development” [8].   The 
committee also stressed that, for pesticides, “neurodevelopmental effects must be part of 
the battery of end points evaluated,” and that “greater attention is needed to develop a 
broader understanding of the principles guiding developmental toxicity” of humans [8].  
As we will see, the first prescription has been only partially fulfilled by the EPA, while 
university scientists have tremendously broadened the understanding of developmental 
neurotoxicity. 
The report’s publication in 1993 found a receptive audience in the newly 
inaugurated Clinton Administration, which became a strong supporter of pesticide reform 
[73].  The report also renewed the attention of environmental groups, which had shied 
away from the pesticide issue since a Natural Resources Defense Council-inspired 1989 
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“CBS 60 Minutes” report on carcinogenic effects of the pesticide Alar caused major 
public relations problems [74]. Despite the scientific support from the NAS committee and 
powerful political proponents in the mid 1990s, the prospect that a Food Quality 
Protection Act incorporating nearly all of the report’s recommendations might pass 
seemed unlikely, especially given the staunch opposition from agricultural advocates, 
chemical and pesticide manufacturers, and the Republican-controlled Congress [73].   Yet 
in August of 1996, in a move that surprised many environmental and health advocates—
then-EPA assistant administrator Lynn Goldman remarked, “A million people told us we 
would never get something like this through”—Congress passed the Food Quality 
Protection Act by a unanimous vote [2, 10]. 
The Food Quality Protection Act, actually an amendment to both FIFRA and 
FFDCA but a substantial piece of legislation in its own right, represented a monumental 
shift in the regulation of pesticides, and stands as a rare example of the precautionary 
principle enacted into American law.   Though several versions of the bill circulated 
through congressional committees for years, the final votes took place with very little 
floor debate (just 28 seconds in the Senate), which is perhaps one of the factors that 
allowed the law to pass [75].  On the surface the bill contained several provisions 
calculated to win support from both health advocates and pesticide manufacturers.  From 
a health perspective, the law eliminated requirements that EPA consider the risks and 
benefits of a pesticide when making regulatory decisions; rather, the law simply directed 
that the EPA consider health risk.  In a major victory for children’s health advocates, the 
FQPA also instituted an extra ten-fold safety factor (referred to as the 10-X provision) 
instructing the EPA to reduce allowable pesticide tolerances by a full order of magnitude 
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unless “reliable data” could show that a weaker standard would not cause “pre- and post-
natal toxicity” [2].  This new provision, based on advice from the NAS report, was a 
reversal of traditional risk assessment, for it mandated reduced exposures based on 
reasonable suspicion and without concrete evidence of harm.  The EPA, on rare occasion, 
had used a similar extra safety factor prior to the FQPA, but only in the setting of strong 
evidence for adverse effects or glaring omissions in a pesticide’s toxicology database.  
The FQPA extended this safety factor to all pesticides and then stipulated that it be 
removed only with strong evidence of safety. 
As even the most casual observer is sure to note, the terminology and regulations 
surrounding pesticides can often be esoteric, complex and counterintuitive.  To cancel a 
pesticide use is to ban it; for example, the EPA cancelled all of DDT’s uses in 1973.  A 
tolerance is the maximum limit for pesticide residue in food, e.g. EPA’s highest tolerable 
amount of malathion remaining on apples is the tolerance for malathion on apples when 
they leave the farm.  The highest dose of a pesticide that does not harm rats or other 
experimental animals is called the “No Observed Adverse Effects Level,” or NOAEL.  
This level is set by exposing thousands of animals to varying levels of pesticides and 
monitoring the effects.  The ten-fold, or 10-X, “safety factor” (sometimes referred to as 
“database uncertainty factor”) set forth in the Food Quality Protection Act is slightly 
more complex, and is an extension of two uncertainty factors used in traditional risk 
assessment.  Prior to the FQPA, EPA regulators determined the allowable level of 
exposure for a given pesticide, like malathion, by determining the NOAEL in animals, 
then dividing that amount by a factor of ten, and then ten again, to estimate “safe” dose 
for the pesticide.  The first division by ten is supposed to account for possible biological 
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variation in the response to malathion between humans and experimental animals, while 
the second ten-fold reduction accounts for differences between individuals within a 
species.  The FQPA’s 10-X provision comprised a third ten-fold reduction in allowable 
exposure from the NOAEL, this time to prevent risks to developing infants and children.  
The main point of this reduction, proponents argued, was that the EPA had calculated the 
NOAEL based on adult studies that told little about effects on developing organisms.  As 
we will see, the complexity of this concept was an important part of the bill’s passage. 
The FQPA also introduced two new terms for risk assessors, “aggregate risk” and 
“cumulative risk,” which represent major changes in pesticide regulation.  Prior to this 
bill, the EPA set tolerances for pesticides individually and considered only the exposures 
from food, ignoring that nearly every individual was exposed to many pesticides daily 
and through various means.  The new “aggregate risk” section required that the EPA 
consider all pathways of exposure, not just food, but also drinking water, residential, and 
occupational exposures together.  The “cumulative risk” section stated that the EPA must 
take into account the additive effects of exposures to all pesticides with a common 
mechanism when setting tolerances, the organophosphates’ effect on cholinesterase being 
the prime example [2].  For a child exposed to thirteen different types of OPs (about 
average for an American), the old methodology would examine each pesticide’s level as 
if none of the others were present [76].  The new standard would take into account all nine 
insecticides and look for additive or synergistic effects from this mixture. 
Despite these concessions to the health side, industry groups gained one 
significant victory, the elimination of the feared Delaney Clause as it was applied to 
pesticides.  In 1992, just four years earlier, the Natural Resources Defense Council 
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(NRDC) won a lawsuit allowing for easier application of the clause (which applied a 
“zero risk” standard to any carcinogenic food additive), and many in the food industry 
were concerned about losing products to cancellation under this rule.  In 1998, two years 
after the bill passed, an article in Chemical Market Reporter, an industry trade journal, 
continued to focus on the clause, claiming that “the FQPA was designed to replace the 
outdated, zero-tolerance Delaney Clause with realistic, safe and science-based pesticide 
residue tolerances” [77].  According to Ken Cook, a person heavily involved in the FQPA 
negotiations as co-founder and president of the Environmental Working Group, the 
structure of the debate in the House Energy and Commerce Committee had much to do 
with the bill’s success [73].   
Before describing the activities of the abovementioned committee, I must make 
another note on terminology relevant to its proceedings.  Though I often categorize the 
“industry” position as monolithic in this paper, it is important to make a distinction 
between the food processing industry and the pesticide industry.  The food processing 
industry primarily wanted to eliminate the Delaney Clause, whereas the pesticide 
producers and consumers held a much greater stake in the overall regulatory outcome.  
Perhaps equally important to note is the fact that the committee chose their “industry” 
representative from the food processors, who possessed more political clout than the 
pesticide manufacturers.  
In early 1996 committee chairman Tom Bliley (R-VA) organized a small drafting 
team in the hopes of negotiating a compromise bill.  The team included Henry Waxman 
(D-CA), ranking Democrat in the Health Subcommittee; John Dingell (D-MI), ranking 
minority member of the Commerce Committee; two lobbyists, one of whom was from the 
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Environmental Working Group and other of whom was from “industry;” and 
representatives of the EPA and FDA [75].  Notably absent from this group were 
representatives from the pesticide manufacturers. While Waxman and the environmental 
lobbyist actively pushed for pesticide reform, the lone food processor “industry” member 
was concerned with eliminating the Delaney Clause.  The committee produced a bill 
containing nearly all of the 1993 NAS report’s recommendations, and which was nearly 
identical to the FQPA later passed by Congress.  Several observers note how the pesticide 
industry, agriculture groups, and most members of Congress knew little about the 
potential ramifications of many of the bill’s provisions; instead, and perhaps because of 
the complex nature of the provisions, many supported a bill that they might have 
otherwise opposed [73, 75, 77].  Congressman Charles Stenholm (D-TX), ranking Democrat 
on the House Agriculture Committee later remarked, “Most people didn’t know what was 
in it, not even me” [10].  Some observers later noted, however, that lawmakers’ claims of 
ignorance might have been a somewhat disingenuous attempt at disassociation from 
suddenly unpopular legislation.  Perhaps the act garnered many votes, in addition to 
either genuine support or a lack of understanding, because many conservative members 
of Congress found it difficult to vote against a bill advertised as protecting children’s 
health.  These conservative representatives likely faced political pressure to support an 
environmental act.  In fact, a newspaper article noted the Republican Party’s poor 
approval ratings in mid-1996, particularly on environmental issues, following a 
government shut down earlier that year, and speculated, “GOP leaders desperately 
wanted a quick environmental victory, especially with the Republican National 
Convention—and the nomination of Dole as the party’s presidential candidate—
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approaching in a matter of weeks” [10]. 
On August 3rd, 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the law almost immediately 
after Congress passed it.  In his remarks at the signing ceremony, he stated that the act 
“puts the safety of our children first” by setting a “high standard—if a pesticide poses a 
danger to our children, it won't be in our food, period” [71].  The FQPA now posed an 
enormous challenge for the EPA, an agency already falling behind on pesticide tolerance 
reassessments for over two decades [7].  The act required the agency to review nearly 
9,700 pesticide tolerances (each pesticide has many different tolerances, e.g. parathion 
with apples, parathion with strawberries, parathion with corn, etc.) within ten years.  The 
first third was to be finalized by August 1999, the second third by August 2002, and the 
final third by August 2006.  Furthermore, re-registration decisions had to use the new 
health-based standards, including the ambitious cumulative and aggregate risk mandates 
and the unprecedented 10-X provision [2].  Much of this was imposed upon a rather 
reluctant staff at the EPA, many of whom were unaware of the new law until it passed.  
Daniel Barolo, the head of the EPA’s pesticide office at the time, underscored the 
suddenness of the FQPA, saying “To say we were surprised to learn about this is putting 
it mildly” [10]. 
 
Total Organophosphate Elimination? 
If you don't like bugs, 1998 could be a bad year. For in the next six weeks, 
the Environmental Protection Agency may promulgate the most sweeping 
anti-insecticide regulations in U.S. history. If it does, billions of dollars 
worth of crops may be lost annually, children may die from cockroach-
related asthma and fire ant bites, and Lyme disease-carrying ticks may 
proliferate. And you may find that some of those raisins in your raisin bran, 
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well, aren't. 
-Michael Fumento, April 2, 1998, Editorial in 
 the Wall Street Journal [78] 
“In my mind, FQPA stands for ‘farmers quit planting in America’.”  
-A farmer from Michigan, quoted on the ACPA 
 Website, July 1998 [79] 
“FQPA could become Idaho agriculture’s Waterloo, its Gettysburg, it’s that 
serious...OPs are our antibiotics, carbamates our sulfa drugs.”  
-Pat Takasugi, Idaho Dept. of Agriculture, at EPA  
hearing in Boise, July 1998 [79] 
In March of 1997, when the EPA announced how the FQPA implementation 
would proceed, farming groups and pesticide manufacturers began to realize the possible 
implications of the law and became worried about possible cancellations or bans.  The 
EPA declared its review would begin with the 39 organophosphates, due to their high 
potential for toxicity (one group termed it “Worst First”) [79].  In response, several groups, 
most prominently the American Crop Protection Association (ACPA)—an organization 
representing the pesticide companies—and its president Jay Vroom, began a public 
relations campaign to discredit the law and weaken implementation [80].  They made 
frequent calls for “sound science” in risk assessment, and claimed that the EPA 
implementation of the precautionary 10-X provision was “driven more by unnecessarily 
strict interpretation of the legal language than by thorough scientific evaluation” [77, 81].  
Daniel Byrd, a toxicologist writing for the libertarian Cato Institute in 1997, generally 
summarized these arguments by claiming that “science got walloped in the FQPA,” 
particularly in regard to the 10-X provision [75].  “The ultimate casualty,” he continued, 
“likely will be the health of Americans, especially the poor,” because “decreased 
pesticide use” will lead to “more expensive food, diminished food availability and poorer 
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food quality” [75].  In an attempt to protect Americans from “the negligible health risks 
from pesticides on foods,” he concluded, the Food Quality Protection Act “may well 
protect some of us from quality food” [75].  Byrd’s argument that the FQPA would 
actually harm human health rather than enhance it would later become a popular criticism 
of the law.  
In addition to the external political and public relations disputes over the FQPA, 
disagreement within the EPA existed as well. Clinton Administration political appointees 
struggled to convince EPA career toxicologists and regulators that the new law, and 
particularly the 10-X safety factor, required fundamental changes from the agency’s long-
standing practices [82].  Many environmental and health advocates, including agency chief 
Carol Browner and assistant administrator Lynn Goldman as well as EWG and NRDC, 
wanted a strict interpretation of the clause, true to its precautionary intent, and an 
immediate imposition of the safety factor on all pesticides for which the EPA lacked 
developmental studies.  Pro-pesticide groups and many agency toxicologists claimed that 
the extra safety factor should only apply if the agency possessed evidence of harm  [82].  
An obvious tension regarding the 10-X factor existed between the “precautionary 
principle,” acting to prevent potential danger without waiting for full evidence, and 
“sound science,” acting only if clear evidence exists.  A late-1997 pesticide review 
sparked by Congressman Henry Waxman admitted that the EPA had applied the 10-fold 
safety factor in only nine out of 90 tolerance decisions to date, though the agency lacked 
developmental data for nearly all pesticides [82].  Although this substantial tightening of 
some tolerances would have been a victory for environmental groups under pre-FQPA 
legislation, the NRDC saw the partial application as an abandonment of the FQPA’s 
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precautionary intent.  Al Meyerhoff, a lawyer from the NRDC, said, in response to the 
report, “We are witnessing the slow dismantling of the new statute, and it is a sad sight” 
[82]. 
By February of 1998, as the EPA steadily labored in the background, the public 
outcry reached a fevered pitch, particularly around organophosphates.  On the fifth of that 
month, a leaked agency document, which outlined several different scenarios for 
organophosphate management—including total cancellation, possibly even by May—
created an upheaval in the farm and industry sectors [80].  Though the briefing paper was 
written deep within the bureaucracy and only for discussion purposes, many took it to 
mean that a blanket prohibition was very likely, if not inevitable [10].  Reassurance from 
EPA officials that a ban was extremely unlikely and that no pesticides would be cancelled 
that year did little to improve the situation.  A February 25th memorandum written by 
chief EPA administrator Carol Browner to other senior agency officials further 
complicated matters by bringing attention to the precautionary 10-X provision.  The 
memo generally echoed the text of the FQPA, stating that in situations where the EPA 
was uncertain about the need for studies on child-specific concerns, “then that uncertainty 
itself should mandate application of an additional safety factor" [83].  ACPA president Jay 
Vroom charged that the memo “profoundly illustrates political mischief is underway,” 
and claimed that the EPA was advancing the environmentalists’ agenda by 
“unconditionally and incontestably” implementing the 10-X safety factor [83].  He 
contended that environmental groups “want scalps on the wall” and a ban on many 
pesticides by refusing to wait for “sound science” [83].   
Based on the leaked memo about total OP cancellation, the pesticide industry 
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launched a massive lobbying campaign [10]. A 1998 report by the Consumer’s Union 
(CU)—a self-described nonprofit consumer organization and publisher of Consumer 
Reports—accused Vroom and the ACPA of creating the public panic by organizing a 
“campaign of fear” with a “rumor that EPA is planning an immediate ban of an entire 
class of insecticides, the organophosphates” [79].  The CU report supported its claim with 
contemporaneous statements from the 1998 ACPA website (no longer available) about 
the possible ban:  “If, as has been rumored, EPA cancelled all OP registrations at once... 
an outbreak of the Mediterranean fruit fly in California or Florida could quickly devastate 
as much as 50 percent or more of each state’s fresh produce business,” and “in apple-
growing regions, growers would find their crops so infested by insect larvae that the 
fresh-apple market would be virtually destroyed” [79].  It also quoted an advertisement in 
several farming magazines sponsored by the ACPA and Farm Bureau, which depicted a 
flyswatter with the caption, “Act now!  Or this may be the only pest control tool you’ll 
ever use again!” [79].  The ACPA sent over 20,000 brochures and faxes to growers across 
the country urging them to apply “political pressure” [10].  These tactics were evidently 
successful in precipitating alarm among the agricultural community.  A May 1998 article 
in Wallaces Farmer confirmed that, “farmers fear the loss of insecticides in the 
organophosphate family” [84]. 
Facing pressure from farmers concerned about the potential loss of the OPs as 
well as the use of the 10-X child safety factor, Congressmen from agricultural states 
undertook several steps to slow the FQPA implementation.  As the Washington Post later 
noted on the subject, the law seemed destined to become “a classic example of how the 
complex process of agency rulemaking is often far more important that congressional 
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legislating” [85].  In early April 1998, two Southern Democrats, Charles W. Stenholm of 
Texas, a cotton grower himself, and Marion Berry of Arkansas, appealed to Vice 
President Al Gore to step in and calm the situation.  In Stenholm’s words, some in the 
EPA “appeared to be running amok” [10, 86].  Thus, on April 8th, 1998, Gore, despite his 
strong environmental ties, sent a four-page memo to the EPA instructing the agency to 
work more closely with the USDA, whose views more closely resembled those of the 
farm and pesticide industries, and requesting that the EPA increase consultation with 
these industries in the review process [86].  Though many health and environmental groups 
saw this move as an act to stall the pesticide review, Ken Cook of EWG commented, “I 
have a hard time concluding that it is… any kind of sellout…. It is a bone that is being 
thrown out to the agriculture interests, it seems to me, that really anticipates tough 
decisions” [81].   
In response to the Vice President’s memo, the EPA created the Tolerance 
Reassessment Advisory Committee (TRAC), which allowed for greater stakeholder 
input, particularly from the pesticide industry and farm groups.  The committee was far 
from balanced, and food, agriculture, and pesticide industry groups outnumbered 
environmental and consumer groups twenty-four to seven [10].  Within a year, all seven 
TRAC members representing environmental and health organizations resigned.  They 
expressed their opposition to the committee in a letter to the EPA, stating that their 
“worst fears have been realized” and that, through “endless debate,” the process created 
“a tremendous drain on agency resources and has delayed concrete EPA action to protect 
America's children” [77].  Consumer’s Union later described the committee as a forum to 
“re-open the debate about whether the 10-X provision was justified (a debate Congress 
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had already resolved with its unanimous vote)” [87]. 
 Consumer groups, pesticide lobbyists, and agriculture advocates attacked the EPA 
from all sides.  On June 25th, 1998, the House Agriculture Committee held hearings in 
which the EPA was castigated for its actions on the FQPA [88].  Several congressmen 
decried the lack of transparency in EPA’s actions, and chairman Bob Evans of Oregon 
claimed that the agency was “rejecting the opportunity to ask for the scientific data” [88].  
Perhaps most telling about the FQPA and the public outcry that surrounded the OPs was 
a statement by Arizona Farm Bureau President Bob Evans.  He claimed, “The 
agricultural community and members of Congress were repeatedly reassured by EPA that 
FQPA was merely the codification or formalization of existing EPA authority,” adding, 
“This is the source of our greatest sense of betrayal” [88]. 
To support their efforts in Congress, the Farm Bureau commissioned agricultural 
researchers at Texas A&M and Auburn universities to conduct economic and crop 
analyses to show the potential losses from the speculated total ban on organophosphates 
and carbamates [89].  The reports concluded that the ban would cause “more food imports 
from foreign nations, higher food prices for American consumers, less consumption of 
nutritionally important fruits and vegetables, lower crop yields and increased production 
costs for America's farmers;” in all, the United States would lose $17 billion [90].  The 
Farm Bureau also funded a study by the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis examining the 
potential adverse health consequences from this type of ban, which concluded that a ban 
could result in the premature deaths of up to 1,000 Americans per year [91, 92].  Based on 
these results, Farm Bureau president Dean Kleckner concluded, “The incomplete science 
EPA is proposing to implement this law with will result in all pain and no gain,” and that, 
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“the only winners are foreign farmers over whom EPA has no control” [93]. 
In 1998, Consumer’s Union and the Environmental Working Group conducted 
analyses of their own on the health risks of organophosphates to children.  Reports from 
both groups used government data to conclude that the elimination of certain “risk 
drivers,” or certain pesticide-food combinations, would drastically reduce OPs’ risks to 
children – a far cry from calling for a total organophosphate ban.  EWG’s report, entitled 
“Overexposed, ” claimed that about one million American children consume “an unsafe 
dose of organophosphate insecticides” daily, and that 100,000,000 children were exposed 
to a food dose ten times the acceptable limit, based on government data [94].  The EWG 
called for several targeted (and prescient) actions to reduce this daily exposure, including 
the elimination of indoor OP uses, the removal of OPs from crops used in baby food, the 
cancellation of five high risk OPs (including chlorpyrifos, methyl parathion, and azinphos 
methyl), and the requirement for developmental neurotoxicity studies [94].  CU’s “Worst 
First” report prescribed similar actions, identifying forty insecticide uses on nine types of 
fruits and vegetables (a very small segment of total OP use) consumed frequently by 
children, namely apples, pears, peaches, grapes, oranges, green beans, peas, potatoes, and 
tomatoes [79].  CU also emphasized that, contrary to industry claims, there were “many 
viable alternatives to high-risk OP” insecticides, evidenced by the fact that “most growers 
of the nine crops… already get by without using these high-risk chemicals” [79].  Both the 
CU and EWG contended that the pesticide industry had exaggerated the possibility of 
total OP cancellation. 
The EPA worked slowly to meet the August 1999 deadline for the first third 
review of pesticide tolerances.  As part of overall pesticide reassessment, the EPA was 
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now forced to consider the adverse health effects of pesticides on the developing bodies 
and brains of infants and children.  Since the early 1990s, research on the subject had 
grown substantially, leading the EPA to consider developmental neurotoxicity as the 
“critical effect” in setting protective standards for OPs [87].  University toxicologists had 
studied developmental neurotoxicity in many OPs, the most impressive findings of which 
came from a series of studies at Duke University on a widely used organophosphate 
called chlorpyrifos.  In 1997 Duke scientists published a study demonstrating significant 
distortion of rodent brain development with “cellular, synaptic, and behavioral 
aberrations” after exposure to chlorpyrifos doses far lower than those necessary to cause 
acute toxicity or even changes in brain weight (one of the few endpoints examined by 
EPA studies) [95, 96].  This growing body of academic research on neurological 
consequences of low-level OP exposure, coupled with the EPA’s resolution to focus OP 
regulation based on developmental neurotoxicity, helped the agency more thoroughly 
assess pesticide tolerances appropriate for infants and children.  
In 1998 the EPA’s Scientific Advisory Panel, determining that the agency lacked 
necessary data on developmental neurotoxicity, strongly recommended that tests of 
“cognition, memory, and other higher brain functions be included in the neurotoxicity 
assessment” [97].  The panel also reinforced the precautionary intent of the FQPA, perhaps 
in response to the tumultuous and antagonistic political climate, stating, “if appropriate 
toxicity data are not available, the FQPA 10x safety factor should not be removed” [97].  
The next year, based on these recommendations, the EPA began requiring developmental 
neurotoxicity studies from all manufacturers of OPs [98].  Many children’s health 
advocates saw this requirement as a major step towards safer pesticide use and 
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fundamental to the FQPA’s implementation.  As we shall see, however, the results of this 
early promise remain largely unfulfilled today.  EPA collected only a handful of DNT 
studies by the end of the 10-year FQPA process, and has not completed any systematic 
review.  Moreover, the agency, with a few significant exceptions, used no developmental 
neurotoxicity data in setting pesticide tolerances despite vocal complaints from its 
Scientific Advisory Panel, a scathing report from its Inspector General, and protests from 
health groups and scientists.  
 
Enforcement Begins 
That chemical manufacturers contend there is no evidence to prove these 
chemicals may cause subtle but adverse effects on behavior and cognitive 
abilities isn't surprising. You can't find what you don't look for. The fact is, 
pesticides known to be toxic to the brain have not been tested for these 
impacts on the young and cannot be assumed safe for developing children 
under the current EPA limits. 
-Jeannine Kenney, April 22, 1998, Letter in the Wall Street Journal [99] 
 By the summer of 1999, with the August deadline for the first third of pesticide 
reviews rapidly approaching, the EPA faced a difficult set of options.  The agency was 
expected to make re-registration or cancellation decisions on the 39 priority 
organophosphates, and nearly every option seemed sure to result in a lawsuit from one 
side or the other.  So, the agency negotiated a compromise solution with the four primary 
manufacturers of two of the most dangerous OPs.  In conjunction with the pesticide 
manufacturers, who remained angry over most of EPA’s decisions, the EPA banned most 
food uses of methyl parathion and posed restrictions on azinphos methyl use [100].  ACPA 
president Jay Vroom proclaimed that the groups only agreed to the settlement “because 
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they knew there was the threat of a food scare” [100].  Yet the actions on these two 
pesticides did little to mollify environmental and health groups, including Consumer’s 
Union, who had expected a full review of the 39 OPs and claimed that most of the 3,200 
pesticide decisions had “no impact on food safety” [100].  CU later argued that the EPA 
had simply “‘cherry-picked’ the biggest and ripest targets for risk-reduction” [87].  
Furthermore, a lawyer for the NRDC argued that the burden of proof should have been on 
the pesticide manufacturers to prove that their products were safe, claiming, “There is 
significant evidence that much lower levels of these chemicals at critical levels of 
development can cause lifelong deficits, potentially" [100].  Later that day, the NRDC filed 
a lawsuit against the EPA maintaining that the agency failed to follow the 
congressionally mandated schedule for the FQPA review.  In an editorial several days 
later, the New York Times acknowledged that the EPA faced a difficult scientific and 
regulatory task, but agreed that “ the environmental groups are surely justified in 
complaining that the E.P.A.’s pace has been sluggish” [101]. 
Though controversial, the first round of decisions somewhat quieted the public 
angst over the OPs, and much of the future wrangling took place in the courtroom and 
within the agency.  The Farm Bureau and the ACPA made one last legislative effort by 
supporting the introduction of two bills by House Republicans aimed at overturning 
sections of the FQPA.  Richard Pombo’s (R-CA) “Regulatory Fairness and Openness 
Act” nearly paralyzed the pesticide review by imposing strict data requirements, and at 
one point gained over 200 supporters, but ultimately never underwent a full vote [102].  In 
response to the NRDC’s lawsuit in 1999, the ACPA and Farm Bureau, among twenty 
plaintiffs, filed a lawsuit of their own, attempting to force the EPA to use similar strict 
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data requirements [102].  In a move that surprised both environmental and industry groups, 
the animal-rights organization People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) also 
sued the EPA, arguing that DNT testing was not scientifically validated and resulted in 
the unnecessary deaths of at least 1,200 animals per study (PETA later started a public 
relations campaign calling the NRDC and the World Wildlife Fund “Mean Greenies” due 
to their support of the DNT testing) [103].   
 
Chlorpyrifos: Effects Observed 2000-2001 
Maybe the EPA will do the right thing.... Maybe it won't kill asthmatic children 
by banning potent roach-killing sprays.  But a lot of little critters have their 
antennae crossed hoping otherwise. 
-Michael Fumento, April 2, 1998, Editorial in the  
Wall Street Journal [78] 
There is simply no credible scientific evidence that Dursban products harm 
people or the environment when used properly.... No significant adverse health 
effects will likely result from exposures to Dursban, even at levels substantially 
above those expected to occur when applied at label rates. 
-Advertising Claims by Dow AgroSciences between 1995-2003 regarding 
Chlorpyrifos (Dursban) [104] 
Chlorpyrifos is one of the great success stories in pest control today. 
-Dow AgroSciences Website, March 2007 
A section on chlorpyrifos, one of the most commonly used OPs at over 30 million 
pounds per year, warrants attention not as an example of corporate malfeasance but for 
two reasons of historical significance.  Firstly, scientists have studied the DNT effects of 
this organophosphate more thoroughly than any other pesticide, largely due to work of 
the Duke toxicology department and one scientist in particular, Theodore Slotkin.  
Secondly, chlorpyrifos remains the only major OP for which the EPA has incorporated 
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developmental neurotoxicity data into its review process, largely due to Slotkin’s studies.  
I include here an appropriate mention of the evolution of our understanding of 
chlorpyrifos’s developmental neurotoxicity because it constituted the leading edge of 
knowledge for all OPs.  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, toxicologists regarded chlorpyrifos as safer than 
most other organophosphates.  It was thought that chlorpyrifos only caused persistent 
neurological problems, similar to those seen from “ginger jake,” at exposure levels 
greater than those required for frank poisoning, and thus greater than established “safe” 
levels [105].   However new studies illustrated increased neurological susceptibility in 
developing animals as compared to developed animals, leading scientists to question the 
safety of “safe” exposure levels.  Regulators responded to this concern by measuring 
cholinesterase levels, which they believed would straightforwardly monitor exposure 
consequences [70, 95, 106].  From a regulatory perspective, good measurements lead to safe 
tolerance levels.   
In the mid-1990s, scientist found evidence that nicotine could act as a teratogen, 
working to “mis-wire” the brain by acting on neurotransmitters important for the complex 
process of nervous system formation [105].  Building on these discoveries, in the late 
1990s Duke scientists revealed that chlorpyrifos’s actions could occur entirely separately 
from, and at lower levels than, its effects on cholinesterase.  Regulators realized a need to 
reform the conclusion that monitoring cholinesterase levels in animal models was 
sufficient for setting safe chlorpyrifos exposure levels.  By the time the EPA issued its 
ruling on chlorpyrifos, research on the subject had mushroomed, and over the next few 
years scientists elucidated chlorpyrifos’s toxic effects down to the molecular level [105]. 
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In 1999, amidst the frenzied debate over agricultural OP use and food tolerances, 
the EPA quietly increased its focus on indoor organophosphate exposures.  For years 
environmental groups had preached against the residential use of the chlorpyrifos 
(manufactured by Dow AgroSciences, marketed under the trade names Dursban and 
Lorsban, and present in products including Raid sprays and Black Flag Roach and Insect 
Killer), particularly when young children were present.  These groups pointed to the 
studies on developmental neurotoxicity as well as anecdotal reports of poisoning, which 
skeptics dismissed as “junk science” [107].  Physician and toxicologist Ronald Gots 
argued, “activists are trying to build a case against the vast body of existing science 
showing chlorpyrifos is safe,” and declared the activists’ claims scientifically baseless 
[107].  The next year a study published in Environmental Health Perspectives showed that 
chlorpyrifos was not only persistent and long-lasting indoors, but was present at much 
higher concentrations than previously expected [108].  Simultaneously, Duke researchers 
continued to find chlorpyrifos-induced developmental neurotoxicity at progressively 
lower concentrations and through previously unexpected mechanisms [96, 109].  Perhaps a 
major turning point in focusing the EPA’s attention was a 1999 study showing that out of 
all the counties in New York State the heaviest pesticide use occurred in the urban 
boroughs of Manhattan and Brooklyn, rather than in the agricultural counties upstate [110].   
In 2000 the EPA, upon reviewing the scientific evidence, decided that indoor OP 
uses posed a serious health hazard to children and began negotiating with the pesticide 
maker Dow AgroSciences for the removal of chlorpyrifos from the indoor pesticide 
market.  Many conservative groups cried foul and disputed the EPA’s decision.  One such 
group, the Heartland Institute (HI), employed the strategy of touting a pesticide’s health 
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benefits while minimizing its risks.  The OPs, they claimed, were “extremely effective in 
controlling cockroaches, whose feces, the World Health Organization says, are a 
principle cause of asthma” [111].  The HI incorrectly proclaimed that “no deaths or even 
illnesses have been linked to their use,” [111].  Finally, in June 2000, and despite the 
protestations, the EPA announced an accord that would eliminate all indoor and several 
agricultural uses—about 50% of the 20 million pound market—of chlorpyrifos and 
diazinon, a similar high risk OP [112].   
Environmental and health groups hailed the June 2000 decision as a major 
victory, while the Vice President of Dow AgroSciences, Elin Miller, refused to 
acknowledge the pesticide’s risks.  Speaking on behalf of the company, Miller stated, 
“The rules have changed, but the safety of chlorpyrifos hasn’t” [112].  Notably, in 2003, 
New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer forced a $2 million settlement with Dow 
AgroSciences for making false advertising statements about chlorpyrifos’s safety.  
Spitzer’s office called the settlement “the largest enforcement penalty ever obtained in a 
pesticide case” [104].  According to the press release, Spitzer sued the company for 
“repeatedly violating a 1994 agreement,” in which Dow “agreed to stop making claims 
that its products were ‘safe,’” [104].  Yet as late as 2003, Dow’s website stated that the 
proper use of chlorpyrifos yielded “wide margins of safety for both adults and children” 
[104]. 
As late as 2007, Dow AgroSciences carefully noted on its website that the 2000 
agreement was not in fact a ban.  This distinction remains relevant as the EPA’s pesticide 
reviews often carry significant weight in the pesticide regulation of other countries.  Dow 
AgroSciences’s website for Latin America, where many countries still use chlorpyrifos 
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residentially, presented the EPA’s 2000 action as the result of a simple bureaucratic 
maneuver.  Under the FQPA, the website claimed, EPA “applied standards far more 
restrictive than those historically established by the scientific community and other 
competent regulatory authorities around the world” [113].  “The rules changed,” they 
contended, “but the studies done with chlorpyrifos have not changed,” and trumpeted that 
the pesticide “has not been banned as reported in many popular press articles” [113].  In the 
toxicology section, the company maintained that the only chronic toxic effects from 
chlorpyrifos were “those associated with the inhibition of cholinesterase enzymes,” and 
that even at doses thirty times higher than the NOAEL, “no adverse effects were 
observed during [a] two-year test period” [113].  A contemporaneous comprehensive 
review of chlorpyrifos toxicology strongly contradicted this finding, stating, “the 
delayed-onset deficits after chlorpyrifos exposure are evoked at doses either below the 
threshold for detectable cholinesterase inhibition” [20].  This careful maneuvering allowed 
Dow AgroSciences to continue to manufacture and ship Dursban overseas after agreeing 
to eliminate domestic (in both senses of the word) use. 
At the close of the 10-year FQPA pesticide review process, the 2000 agreement 
on residential chlorpyrifos use, according to many physicians and environmentalists, 
stood as a critical decision in reducing OP risks to infants and children.  This belief, in 
large part, stemmed from the results of a series of scientific studies, published between 
2004 and 2006 by a group at Columbia University’s Center for Children’s Environmental 
Health.  Beginning in 1997, Columbia researchers measured the levels of chlorpyrifos 
present in the umbilical cord blood of over 200 newborn babies in Harlem and the South 
Bronx (areas with very high levels of indoor chlorpyrifos use) and followed them over 
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several years.  They found that infants with higher levels of chlorpyrifos had lower birth 
weights, often a marker of brain development, and worse scores on a number of neuro-
developmental tests [114, 115].  They also found that infants born after the 2000-2001 phase-
out of the pesticide had significantly lower levels of chlorpyrifos in their bloodstream and 
similarly better outcomes.  These epidemiological studies, the most difficult type in 
pesticide inquiry, received widespread media coverage and convinced many regulators of 
the ban’s effectiveness [116]. 
 
Cumulative Assessment 
I am pleased that the Agriculture Committee has placed the public health 
concerns of our children and elderly above those of the radical and extreme, 
inside-the-beltway fundraising groups who parade around as environmental or 
public safety special interest groups. 
-Rep. Richard Pombo (R-CA), August 2000, on his proposed “Regulatory 
Fairness and Openness Act” [117] 
By late 2000, despite the EPA’s action on several individual organophosphates 
including chlorpyrifos, methyl parathion, and azinphos methyl, environmental groups like 
the NRDC and EWG continued to decry the slow pace of OP review.  The ACPA and the 
Farm Bureau, meanwhile, expressed some measure of relief that the FQPA process had 
not been as stringent as they had feared in eliminating pesticide uses—an April 2000 
report by the General Accounting Office found that the EPA had toughened or eliminated 
only 13 percent of the 3,471 tolerances examined to date [118].  Both sides, however, 
waited in anticipation of EPA’s final decisions on the remaining OPs and on the outcome 
of the controversial cumulative risk assessment (CRA).  As mandated by the FQPA, the 
EPA had to issue tolerances not only on the individual OPs and their health hazards, but 
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also on the group as a whole, considering the additive, or cumulative, effects on the 
nervous system.  Environmental groups saw the CRA as a prime opportunity to cancel 
the most dangerous OP uses, while industry groups made efforts to forestall the process 
and weaken implementation. 
Both the ACPA and the Farm Bureau again, in late 2000, pushed for legislation in 
Congress to weaken the FQPA.  They supported the Regulatory Fairness and Openness 
Act introduced by Rep. Richard Pombo (R-CA), which Pombo described as directing the 
“EPA to use sound science, not the whim of the Washington bureaucracy, to implement 
the FQPA” [117].  The EPA, in response, publicly warned that Pombo’s bill could delay 
implementation of the FQPA’s public health measures and “effectively defeat” the law’s 
deadlines [117].  In November 2000 industry groups scored a minor victory when a district 
court rejected a plea by the NRDC and the EPA to dismiss an industry lawsuit against the 
agency that the EPA said would make the pesticide reassessment process unworkable.  
The suit alleged that EPA had used faulty scientific methods in its review of the OPs, and 
aimed to limit what health data the agency could consider when reviewing pesticides [119].  
Another event that month, the election of George W. Bush as president, bolstered the 
pesticide industry’s confidence and later proved far more important to pesticide policy 
than the court’s decision. 
In January of the following year, industry groups became infuriated after the EPA 
settled an NRDC-led lawsuit out of court in what Chemical Week called an “11th-hour 
deal” [120].  NRDC’s lawsuit, filed in 1999, charged that the EPA had missed deadlines for 
review decisions on pesticides, including the OPs.  The settlement, which NRDC senior 
attorney Erik Olson remarked “had been in the works for years,” included a firm 
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timetable for the remaining OPs and a May 31st, 2002 deadline for the organophosphate 
cumulative risk assessment [121].  The ACPA and other industry groups, who had hoped to 
win concessions with their own court case, complained that the settlement was a political 
attempt to “tie the hands” of the incoming Bush Administration by setting “new 
reassessment schedules that are very arbitrary” [121].  Farm Bureau president Bob 
Stallman claimed that industry groups were surprised by the announcement, grumbling 
“we should have been more cynical and realized that a decision this far-reaching would 
be made on the Clinton Administration’s last day in office” [121].  In the following 
months, new Bush-appointed EPA administrator Christine Todd Whitman tried to 
extricate the agency from the settlement.  However, due to what Whitman termed 
“limited flexibility” in the ruling, the Bush Administration finally acceded, though adding 
an industry concession that created more room for “public comment” on EPA decisions 
[122].  
With a new timetable in place, the EPA had just over a year to complete the CRA 
for the OPs, which had been under development for several years (and, according to 
Consumer’s Union, subject to “protracted debate and interminable review”) [123].  The 
NRDC and CU had hoped that the EPA would now incorporate the incoming 
developmental neurotoxicity data earlier requested by the agency, or at least use the 10-X 
factor where knowledge gaps existed, yet the final debates centered around older, more 
narrow, issues.  Similar to other post-FQPA deliberations, many of the final meetings 
focused on varying estimates for OP exposure levels.  On the health effects side, the EPA 
had already disappointed environmental and health groups with the decision to consider 
the cumulative effects of the anti-cholinesterase carbamates separately from those of the 
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organophosphates, despite their shared mechanism.  In 2001, despite evidence that many 
OPs caused neurotoxic effects at levels below cholinesterase-inhibition, the agency 
decided to focus the risk assessment on cholinesterase levels, largely because these were 
the most easily measured outcomes, when setting allowable OP exposures.  CU and the 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) questioned the EPA’s “methodology that a 10 percent 
depression of brain cholinesterase activity is of no biological significance” given the 
“strong evidence that OPs are developmental neurotoxins” [123].  These same groups, 
however, praised the EPA for the “enormous amount of work invested” in the CRA and 
remained largely supportive of the review [123].  
EPA’s chief administrator Stephen Johnson hailed the May 2002 release of the 
CRA as “good news for American consumers,” and claimed that its “conclusions 
supported a high level of confidence in the safety of the food supply” [124].  The agency 
boasted that the report included “consideration of the FQPA safety factor,” yet 
environmental groups asserted that the “consideration” given was far from sufficient [124].  
One year prior to the report, the EPA retained the full 10-X factor, or a lesser 3-X factor, 
in only 16% of OP decisions.   EPA cited a lack of DNT data as the reason for 
maintaining the 10-X factor in three-quarters of these decisions [87].  Given the growth of 
peer-reviewed literature and the EPA’s dearth of DNT studies, CU and NRDC 
anticipated that the EPA would extend the 10-X uncertainty factor under the CRA to 
many more OPs.  Instead the CRA removed the 3-X factor on four OPs based on limited 
data, and applied only a 3-X factor on several others [125].  The EPA failed to apply the 
10-X factor in all cases where data was lacking, a critical tenet of the FQPA. 
 In their 2002 comments to the EPA, environmental groups claimed that the 
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agency had “flouted the plain language of the FQPA and Congress’ clear intent” [126].  
The following month a majority of participants on the EPA’s own Scientific Advisory 
Panel concurred with this idea, concluding “that the confidence with the available data 
was not sufficient to assure adequate protection with less than the 10x FQPA safety 
factor” [127].  This is a point that bears repeating.  Nearly a decade after the publication of 
the 1993 NAS report, and six years after the FQPA’s passage, a majority of the EPA’s 
advisors agreed that the agency had not sufficiently addressed developmental effects or 
fully applied the 10-X factor, both explicit recommendations of the NAS report and the 
FQPA. 
The 2002 Cumulative Risk Assessment essentially marked the end of the review 
process for the organophosphates.  Industry groups, having suffered a number of OP 
losses under the FQPA—but feeling more secure under the Bush Administration—
remained relatively satisfied with the report’s outcome and largely abandoned their 
political and legal offensives.  Environmental groups, on the other hand, expressed 
frustration with the result, and pointed to the EPA’s failure to fully apply the 10-X safety 
factor or consider adequate DNT studies.  The NRDC sued the EPA, again, over this 
issue, but was ultimately unsuccessful.  The disappointment ran deep for environmental 
health physicians, who saw the OPs as the test case for the FQPA and as an important—
and hazardous—group of its own.  Environmental groups quietly shifted their focus away 
from OPs, developmental neurotoxicity, and the 10-X factor after 2002; however, 
scientists within the EPA increasingly expressed dissatisfaction with the OP results.  By 
2006 many EPA toxicologists and risk assessors felt that political pressure as much as 
science had driven the decisions on the OPs, and began to speak out against earlier 
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conclusions.  
 
Discord at the EPA 
Our colleagues in the Pesticide Program feel besieged by political pressure 
exerted by Agency officials perceived to be too closely aligned with the pesticide 
industry and former EPA officials now representing the pesticide and agricultural 
community.... Equally alarming is the belief among managers in the Pesticide and 
Toxics Programs that regulatory decisions should only be made after reaching 
full consensus with the regulated pesticide and chemicals industy. 
-Local Presidents of EPA Unions, May 24, 2006, Letter to  
Administrator Stephen Johnson [128] 
 In the three years following the 2002 OP cumulative risk assessment the EPA 
gave little public attention to organophosphates, apart from a continued conflict over the 
contentious issue of human testing.  During this time toxicologists at Duke and elsewhere 
continued to understand startling mechanisms of organophosphate induced 
neurodevelopmental damage [129-131].  Even within the EPA scientists became 
increasingly concerned that the OP reregistration had not gone far enough in protecting 
against developmental neurotoxicity.  Yet the EPA offered no public recognition of the 
latest research findings or of internal concerns until, ultimately, the release of an internal 
audit report. 
In January 2006 the Office of Inspector General (OIG), EPA’s self-auditing 
department, released a public report.  The OIG found many faults with EPA’s actions on 
the FQPA stating, “EPA’s required testing does not include sufficient evaluation of 
behavior, learning, or memory in developing animals” and “there is no standard 
evaluation procedure for interpreting results from developmental neurotoxicity tests” [132].  
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Regarding the requested DNT data from manufacturers, “no summaries have been 
released or conclusions drawn” [132].  Furthermore, the OIG concluded that the EPA’s 
core testing guidelines themselves had “no requirement for specific testing of 
developmental neurotoxicity in developing animals” [132].   Ten years after the FQPA 
mandated that EPA assess effects on immature organisms, OIG found “all but two core 
toxicity tests... for food use pesticides are performed in adult animals, including the only 
test of metabolism” [132].  These gaps led the OIG to “fear the loss of public confidence in 
EPA’s commitment to protect infants and children from developmental hazards” [132]. 
 The Inspector General’s report leant credence to those within the agency 
concerned with the lack of DNT data in the OP review.  The report helped kindle an open 
letter, dated May 24, 2006, to EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson, which put these 
concerns on a national stage [128].  In what the Wall Street Journal called an 
“unprecedented and professional rebuke to Mr. Johnson,” union leaders representing over 
9,000 scientists and other employees at the EPA asserted that their “colleagues in the 
Pesticide Program [felt] besieged by political pressure exerted by Agency officials 
perceived to be too closely aligned with the pesticide industry” [128, 133].  They claimed 
that the “integrity of the science upon which agency decisions are based [had] been 
compromised” in a “rush to judgment” to meet the final August 3rd FQPA deadline, and 
echoed the Inspector General’s concerns about the EPA’s neglect of developmental 
neurotoxicity testing [128].  The union leaders finally urged the EPA to “adhere to 
principles of scientific integrity and employ the precautionary approach intended by the 
FQPA” by retaining the 10-X safety factor [128].  Jay Vroom, CropLife America President 
(formerly ACPA), responded to this letter saying, “It is very difficult to place any 
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credibility on [this] assertion of political pressure,” given “the transparency and oversight 
being accorded to the EPA’s activities on pesticide reassessment” [134].  Vroom 
speculated that environmental groups may have been “anticipating scientific findings not 
to their liking and [were] setting the stage for future disagreements and potential 
litigation” [134]. 
 In the short-term the letter had little effect.  In August 2006 the EPA released the 
third and final FQPA report on the OPs.  EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson 
proclaimed, “Whether planting crops, de-bugging a home, working in the garden or just 
sitting down at the dinner table, Americans can now be assured the pesticides used in the 
U.S. meet the highest health standards in the world” [135].  Still many within the EPA 
remained skeptical of the review, particularly over the lack of DNT testing.  EPA senior 
scientist William Hirzy observed that EPA officials “think they dealt with our concerns 
that we raised in the letter, and we don’t think that they have” [136].  Outside the EPA anti-
pesticide groups voiced stronger criticism of the review.  Pesticide Action Network 
senior scientist Margaret Reeves declared, “the OP decision, I think, is a bad one” [136].  
Industry groups, on the other hand, gave guarded praise for the final OP reports.  Ray 
McAllister of CropLife America claimed that the OPs had been “thoroughly 
investigated” and noted the dozens of DNT studies reported to the EPA since 1999  [136].  
“If anything,” he claimed, “the approach EPA has taken has been more conservative, 
more protective, than perhaps they actually need to be” [136]. 
 Thus ends the decade-long organophosphate FQPA review, one of the most 
recent, and public, chapters in the long and controversial history of pesticides.  Neither 
industrial nor environmental groups remained entirely contented with the outcome, but 
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nearly all could agree that, on balance, the FQPA improved pesticide safety and lowered 
risks to children.  Perhaps some of the disappointment experienced by the 
environmentalists at the end of this process stemmed from the high expectations initially 
set by the FQPA, namely its 10-X and “reasonable certainty of no harm” provisions.  
Though the EPA did not implement the law in its entirety, the FQPA did radically change 
the terms of the pesticide debate.  The FQPA forced all parties to adjust their outlooks by 
mandating the EPA to focus exclusively on health, risks to children, and total and 
cumulative risks of organophosphate pesticides. 
 
Conclusion 
 Pesticides are the iconic toxicants of the twentieth century—useful yet ubiquitous, 
effective yet dangerous.  The organophosphates were born as weapons of war, but refined 
and studied by pharmacologists like pharmaceuticals.  The pesticide armamentarium is as 
diverse as the U.S. Pharmacopoeia.  To fully understand pesticides’ adverse effects, one 
must appreciate toxicology, teratology, carcinogenicity, neurodevelopment, laboratory 
limitations, skin and respiratory hazards, indoor and outdoor air dangers, drinking water 
and aquatic risks, food contamination, and worker and consumer threats.  As always 
economics pervades all discussions, and legal and legislative decisions frame the debate.  
Only with an appreciation for this complexity and an understanding of these varied yet 
relevant subjects does one reach the surface of the politics surrounding pesticides—state, 
national, and international—not to mention the aggressive scrutiny of the media and the 
vested interests. 
 The case of developmental neurotoxicity from organophosphates illustrates a 
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small, but consequential, slice of the density involved in pesticide regulation.  It 
exemplifies the evolution of the pesticide debates over the past few decades.  New 
measurement techniques, new toxicological studies, and new modes of thinking—largely 
derived from experiences with lead—allowed developmental neurotoxicity to become the 
primary concern for organophosphates.  The EPA’s failure to reasonably incorporate 
DNT data into the recent review process or fully implement the 10-X safety factor is 
largely a product of economic and political influence in the years following the FQPA, 
and primarily under the Bush administration.   Richard Wiles, a founding member of the 
EWG involved in drafting the FQPA, stressed in 2007 the importance of the safety factor, 
calling it a “policy and legislative first” that “has now become the baseline starting point 
for standard setting even if it is not always applied” [137].  Though the EPA failed to fulfill 
the FQPA’s mandate to consider all pre- and post-natal pesticide effects, this legislation 
drastically reframed the pesticide debate and its precautionary remained at least partially 
intact.  
Before the FQPA, pesticide arguments centered on cost-benefit analyses in which 
health risks were difficult to prove and possible economic costs were readily apparent.  
After the FQPA the EPA could no longer explicitly consider economic factors, and the 
pesticide industry was forced to change its tactics as well – turning to loopholes, 
bargaining, and delay.  The elimination of the Delaney clause, considered a victory for 
the food processing industry, actually worked against the pesticide manufacturers by 
removing the emphasis on cancer and shifting attention to other important health 
consequences, notably neurodevelopment.  The law also moved the focus from 
pesticides’ effects on adult males to the more vulnerable infants and children.  Before the 
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FQPA, according to Wiles, the pesticide fights were “about average [population] risks 
versus cost to apple growers” [137].  The FQPA forced the EPA to ignore the economic 
burden and examine not just average adult risk but specific threats to children.  Wiles 
summarized the overall change succinctly, “Now, for example, a 300 fold safety margin 
on a No Effects level from a developmental neurotoxicity study is considered a weak 
standard.  That's progress” [137]. 
Though the FQPA review process did not extend as far as many health and 
environmental groups had wanted, it did achieve a number of important risk reductions 
on some of the most dangerous organophosphates.  Perhaps most importantly this 
legislation eliminated nearly all indoor uses of the widely used chlorpyrifos and diazinon.  
The act phased out all uses of methyl and ethyl parathion, and set a schedule to eliminate 
all uses of azinphos methyl.  In addition, the FQPA toughened tolerances and other 
allowable limits on many other organophosphates.  If past experiences with lead, 
mercury, PCBs, and other neurotoxicants serve as an appropriate guide, however, we may 
find through further research that even these actions will prove inadequate to 
appropriately protect infants and children.  For example, the true contribution of 
organophosphates to the increasing burden of neurological diseases like autism, mental 
retardation, Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s remains unknown. 
The case of chlorpyrifos may serve as an example of developmental neurotoxicity 
discovery for other OPs.  Academic toxicologists studied developmental effects of 
chlorpyrifos more thoroughly than any other OP, and these results, far more than the EPA 
mandated studies, initiated the agency’s action on this insecticide.  Theodore Slotkin, the 
world’s expert on the DNT effects of chlorpyrifos, noted in a 2004 article that his 
  
72
72
laboratory discovered the prominent neurodevelopmental effects not because chlorpyrifos 
caused this “mis-wiring” more readily than other OPs, but because it was one of the only 
OPs studied in this manner.  Slotkin propounded that a barrier existed between academic 
toxicology, with its focus (and funding) on discovering novel mechanisms of action, and 
regulatory toxicology, with its need for high volume chemical screening [105].   
Slotkin was proactive in offering his concerns and recommendations for pesticide 
regulation to the EPA.  He wrote that EPA “guidelines for developmental neurotoxicity 
are rapidly becoming insufficient to accommodate our increasing knowledge of the 
molecular, biochemical, and cellular processes that underlie brain development,” and 
proposed a new set of guidelines flexible enough to incorporate scientific advancements 
[105].  In the first of two stages, termed high-throughput screening, investigators would 
apply pesticides to neural cell cultures and developing lower-order organisms to identify 
dysfunctional cell division or differentiation.  This stage would incidentally help satisfy 
PETA’s demand for less animal experimentation and the pesticide industry’s demand for 
less expensive testing technology.  The proposed second stage included smaller-scale 
animal testing for traditional toxicology outcomes.  Slotkin and many other toxicologists 
hoped that these two parts would help reduce many of the gaps in the current DNT testing 
system [105]. 
Despite the FQPA’s focus on infants and children, it paid relatively less attention 
to highly exposed populations, particularly farmworkers and their families.  The law 
incidentally offered some increased protection to these groups by reducing or eliminating 
the riskiest OPs, but many poisonings still occur.  Studies in the past few years have 
shown that children of farmworkers have much higher exposures to pesticides as 
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compared to their cohorts [138].  Yet a powerful new tool for protecting farmworkers and 
their children is beginning to mature in the form of biomonitoring, which is simply the 
measurement of chemicals and their metabolites in the bloodstream or urine.  This tool is 
particularly effective for measuring chemicals like organophosphates, which have a 
relatively short lifespan and are difficult to detect with normal sampling techniques.  The 
CDC now tracks the levels of over one hundred chemicals in a representative sample of 
Americans, determining a population average without fully interpreting the data.  This 
information allows environmental health specialists to compare levels in individuals to 
the population average and to provide fairly definitive proof of increased exposures.  
Scientists are already correlating certain bodily concentrations of chemicals with adverse 
outcomes and many believe that they will find stronger associations in the future that will 
provide the basis for stronger legislation [139]. 
Integrated Pest Management (IPM) and organically grown food are two 
burgeoning trends that reduce exposures to neurotoxic insecticides.  IPM uses biological, 
cultural, and physical tools, like crop rotation and cultivation of insect predators, to 
manage pests in a way that minimizes chemical pesticide use.  Farmers grow organic 
food without synthetic pesticides, often using IPM or “natural” pesticides, which reduces 
exposures to both farmworkers and consumers.  A 2003 study in Washington State 
showed that children consuming only organic food had dramatically lower levels of 
organophosphate metabolites in their urine than children eating non-organic diets.  
Several children in the non-organic group, while none in the organic cohort, had levels of 
OPs exceeding the EPA standard [140].   
Complicating the pesticide question, Americans are eating increasing amounts of 
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imported fruits and vegetables, which are generally less regulated than those grown 
domestically.  American pesticide manufacturers can still legally make several 
organophosphate insecticides that are banned in the U.S. to sell in other countries.  
Ironically, the banned pesticides often return to the United States in imported fruits and 
vegetables.  Many of these exported insecticides have tragic consequences for the nations 
that receive them.  Poisonings are common among the untrained rural farmers that use 
organophosphates, and intentional OP overdose is the most common method of suicide in 
many parts of Asia [141]. 
The fights over pesticides are among the most contentious in environmental 
health, yet past experience has shown that the concerns of today are rarely those of 
tomorrow.  Following Silent Spring in 1962, growers predicted dire consequences if the 
government banned organochlorines, yet food shortages did not materialize in the 1970s 
when the EPA cancelled DDT and its brethren.  Furthermore, many insects had already 
developed resistance to the blunt force of the OCs.  Those who use and study pesticides 
are beginning to take a lesson from the physicians and epidemiologists who investigate 
antibiotic resistance.  The answer to “pest” control, whether for bacteria or insects, is in 
the wise, judicious use of the compounds with the fewest side effects.  A shrinking planet 
with a growing population and increased travel will present new pest challenges to both 
doctors and farmers.  The twentieth century era of crude tools like nerve poisons surely 
will end, but the need to control pests will not.   
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